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  • Inhoudsopgave Observant #24, maart 2004

    01 Eigen inlichtingen eerst; Europese spionage
    02 “Scoreboard” and analysis on the threats to civil liberties and privacy in EU terrorism plans
    03 Draft declaration on combating terrorism
    05 EU unites in the fight against Terrorism
    07 European Commission action paper in response to the terrorist attacks on Madrid
    09 EU Council press release
    10 EU: Call for a new intelligence centre to be set up
    11 The Experts Looking Out for Europe’s Security
    12 For our eyes only? Shaping an intelligence community within the EU
    13 Towards a European intelligence policy
    14 Prospects for a European Common Intelligence Policy
    16 Notitie over jihadrekruten in Nederland, AIVD

    Gehele Observant #24


    Observant #24, maart 2004

    special over voorstellen terrorismebestrijding nav bomaanslagen in Madrid

    Eigen inlichtingen eerst
    Europese spionage

    door Jelle van Buuren en Wil van der Schans

    De Groene Amsterdammer
    nr 13 , 27 – 3 – 2004

    Na de aanslagen in Madrid klinkt alom de roep om een gezamenlijke Europese aanpak van de terreurbestrijding. Diezelfde roep klonk na de aanslagen van 11 september in de Verenigde Staten. Een indrukwekkende serie maatregelen en actieplannen werd gelanceerd, maar die blijken in praktijk weinig effect te hebben gesorteerd. Waarom lukt het de Europese Unie toch zo slecht om politie- en inlichtingendiensten te laten samenwerken?

    Met de benoeming van een terrorismepaus, die de coördinatie van de Europese terreurbestrijding ter hand gaat nemen, nieuwe wettelijke maatregelen en vooral veel goede voornemens denken de ministers van Justitie en Binnenlandse Zaken van de Europese lidstaten een adequaat antwoord te hebben gevonden op het vermeende gebrek aan effectieve Europese terreurbestrijding. Maar direct werd al duidelijk dat een écht Europees antwoord er niet in zit. Het Verenigd Koninkrijk, Spanje, Italië, Duitsland en Frankrijk lieten weten vooral onderling inlichtingen te willen uitwisselen en er niet over te peinzen alle lidstaten te laten delen in de geheimen van hun nationale inlichtingendiensten – laat staan de tien nieuwe lidstaten die in mei aanschuiven aan de Europese beleidstafels.


    “Scoreboard” and analysis on the threats to civil liberties and privacy in EU terrorism plans

    This “Scoreboard” shows that 27 of the 57 proposals on the table have little or nothing to do with tackling terrorism – they deal with crime in general and surveillance: Scoreboard and analysis

    1. The tragedy in Madrid on 11 March 2004 requires a response from the EU to review and reinforce counter-terrorist measures. An analysis of the 57 proposals on the table at the EU Summit on 25-26 March in Brussels shows that 30 of these meet this need.
    2. However, the analysis also shows that 27 of the proposals have little or nothing to do with tackling terrorism – they deal with crime in general and surveillance.
    3. A number of the proposals would introduce the wholesale surveillance of everyone in Europe and could potentially be used for social and political control:
    a) through logging all telecommunications (e-mails, phone-calls, mobile-calls, faxes and internet usage;
    b) tracking all air travel in and out and within the EU (effectively an EU version of the USA’s controversial PNR, CAPPS II and US-VISIT plans);
    c) the fingerprinting of nearly everyone in the EU by the introduction of biometric passports and ID cards for citizens and the same for resident third country nationals.
    4. If in defending democracy measures are introduced that fundamentally undermine civil liberties and peoples’ right to privacy, it has to be asked what are we defending?
    Tony Bunyan, Statewatch editor, comments:
    “Under the guise of tackling terrorism the EU is planning to bring in a swathe of measures to do with crime and the surveillance of the whole population. After the dreadful loss of life and injuries in Madrid we need a response that unites Europe rather than divides it”

    Draft declaration on combating terrorism
    from : the Presidency
    to : the European Council
    7486/4/04 REV 4

    The European Council, deeply shocked by the terrorist attacks in Madrid, expresses its sympathy and solidarity to the victims, their families and to the Spanish people. The callous and cowardly attacks served as a terrible reminder of the threat posed by terrorism to our society. Acts of terrorism are attacks against the values on which the Union is founded. The Union and its Member States pledge to do everything within their power to combat all
    forms of terrorism in accordance with the fundamental principles of the Union, the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the obligations set out under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001).
    The threat of terrorism affects us all. A terrorist act against one country concerns the international community as a whole. There will be neither weakness nor compromise of any kind when dealing with terrorists. No country in the world can consider itself immune. Terrorism will only be defeated by solidarity and collective action.


    Extraordinary Council meeting
    Brussels, 19 March 2004
    President : Mr Michael McDOWELL, T.D.
    Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform of

    In the aftermath of the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid, the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council met to give a renewed impulse to the European response to the terrorist threat to our society. The Council started with one minute of silence to commemorate the victims of the terrorist attack of 11 March 2004 in Madrid. The Council focused its debate on practical measures to reinforce practical cooperation with particular reference to ensuring full recourse to the possibilities offered by the Police Chiefs Task Force, Europol and Eurojust. It placed emphasis on the implementation of existing measures directed to reinforcing cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The Council also examined how to improve mechanisms for cooperation between police and security services and promote effective, systematic collaboration in intelligence services between Member States.
    The Council urged the finalization of work on existing measures, which can play their part in combating terrorism. These include, in particular, taking forward work on the Framework Decision on the Mutual recognition of Confiscation Orders, the development of the second generation Schengen Information System and the new Visa Information System and the proposed European Borders Agency. Priority should be given to the proposals under the retention of communication traffic data and exchange of information on convictions.


    EU unites in the fight against Terrorism
    Date: 19 Mar 2004
    Policy Area: Justice and Home Affairs
    Content Type: Press Releases McDowell

    The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Mr Michael McDowell, T.D., today expressed satisfaction at the outcome of the extraordinary meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting which was held as a result of the recent terrorist attack in Madrid.

    Minister McDowell announced that the Council has agreed a draft Declaration on Combating Terrorism incorporating a number of measures that the Minister believes will result in a strong manifesto for a renewed attack on all aspects of the terrorist threat to Europe.




    Brussels, 18 March 2004
    General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union

    In the aftermath of the 11 March terrorist attacks in Madrid, the JHA Council will meet to give a renewed impulse to the European response to the terrorist threat to our society. In particular, the Council will examine a package of measures on fighting against terrorism to bring forward to the European Council on 25 and 26 March 2004. These measures will be prepared by Permanent Representatives Committee before being considered by the extraordinary meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 19 March and the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 22 March. The meetings of both groups of Ministers will pave the way for the European Council to bring forward measures to enhance our work on
    combating terrorism. The measures which will be examined by the Council include a political commitment to assure obligations contained in the Solidarity Clause included in the draft Constitution for Europe (Article
    I-42), measure to revise the action plan on terrorism, the appointment of a security coordinator, enhanced intelligence cooperation, guidelines for a common approach the fight against terrorism, increased EU/UN Coordination in the fight against terrorism, curbing financing of terrorism, measures to reinforce practical cooperation, building on existing cooperation and external


    European Commission action paper in response to the terrorist attacks on Madrid

    DN: MEMO/04/66 Date: 18/03/2004


    Brussels, 18 March

    European Commission action paper in response to the terrorist attacks on Madrid

    The terrorist responsible for the attacks in Madrid have struck against the fundamental principles of all European states and on which the Union is built: respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.

    The Commission does not believe that the right answer to these attacks is proposing new legal instruments or new institutions. First, because most of the legislative and institutional framework is proposed or in place and simply needs to be approved and/or implemented on the ground. Second, because we cannot afford to wait for long legislative procedures to give answers to such atrocities. Priority is now on co-ordinating operational action(1).

    This paper sets out five types of action which the Commission should propose that the Union take in response to these terrorist outrages:

    • Declaration of solidarity, to be pronounced solemnly by the Heads of State and Government at their meeting in Brussels on 25-26 March;

    • Better implementation of existing legislative instruments relevant to the fight against terrorism, and adoption of draft measures already on the Council table;

    • Strengthening the fight against terrorist financing;

    • Enhanced operational coordination and cooperation;

    • External action;

    • Other measures.


    De vaste commissie voor Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties en de vaste commissie voor Justitie hebben op 17 maart 2004 overleg gevoerd met minister Remkes van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties en minister Donner van Justitie over de voorbereiding van de informele JBZ-Raad d.d. 19 maart 2004.

    Aanwezig zijn 9 leden, te weten Albayrak, Wilders, Eurlings, Dittrich, Hermans, Huizinga-Heringa, De Wit, Vos en Wolfsen, en de heer Remkes, minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties en de heer Donner, minister van Justitie.

    De voorzitter: Ik heet de minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties en de minister van Justitie bijzonder welkom in deze extra vergadering, die hoofdzakelijk gaat over de gevolgen van de aanslagen in Madrid. Daarover is een extra vergadering van de ministers van Justitie en Binnenlandse Zaken in Brussel. Dit overleg is ter voorbereiding daarop.

    EU Council press release
    Brussels, 15 Mars 2004

    European Council to Focus on Fight Against Terrorism
    Speaking as President of the European Council, the Taoiseach, Mr Bertie Ahern, made the following statement today (15th March 2004) on proposals to counter terrorism in the aftermath of the 11th March terrorist attacks in Madrid. “The callous and cowardly attacks on 11 March served as a terrible reminder of the threat posed by terrorism to our society. We condemn utterly those who planted the bombs that wrought such destruction and cost so many lives last Thursday. The attacks in Madrid were an attack against the very values on which the Union is founded.

    EU: Call for a new intelligence centre to be set up

    The Belgian Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt, has called for the EU to set up a new “intelligence centre” in the wake of the Madrid bombings. This would, he suggests, play a coordinating role by bringing together member state police, security, intelligence agencies and Europol and by sharing intelligence make an analysis of the terrorist threat. The Netherlands and Austrian governments are said to back the idea.

    Mr Verhofstadt is quoted as saying that Europol has not succeeded in providing a “coherent” anti-terrorist policy (eupolitix.com). According to the Financial Times an internal report published just before the Madrid bombings, prepared by Mr Solana’s team wrote:

    “A number of instruments exist already within the Union to improve operational co-operation and co-ordination. They are however badly used, ratification of conventions is slow and the instruments are poorly used and/or poorly understood by law enforcement and judicial authorities in some member states.”


    The Experts Looking Out for Europe’s Security
    Inteligence online # 468

    This spring a so-named Group of Personalities in the Field of Security Research is to submit a report to the European Commission that will outline a research program for Europe’s future security. It will then lead to a call for proposals for six to eight projects financed to the tune of 65 million euros ($83 million) over a three year period. The sum is tiny compared to the 17.5 billion euro outlay for the EU’s sixth research and development program. In the long run, however, it will lay the cornerstones of a “Homeland Security” system in Europe. Members of the group – legislators, businessmen and researchers-were chosen on the basis of their know-how and skills in the security sector. Their work will be coordinated by the Commission’s Research and Information Society directorates.

    Achtergrondstudies over de mogelijkheid van nauwere samenwerking tussen Europese inlichtingendiensten

    Occasional Paper 50 – January 2004
    For our eyes only? Shaping an intelligence community within the EU
    Björn Müller-Wille
    The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)

    Developing international and cross-agency intelligence cooperation has become imperative in today’s security environment. If the so-called ‘new threats’ are to be tackled collectively, it is not only desirable but also necessary to make collective threat assessments.

    In contrast to other organisations, the EU applies and has to coordinate a broad range of security policy tools. Therefore, it also needs support from different kinds of intelligence agencies to a larger extent than other organisations. To this end, it has already begun to develop its own structure for the production and exchange of various types of intelligence. At present four EU ‘intelligence agencies’ can be identified: the fledgling Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), the Intelligence Division of the European Military Staff (INTDIV), the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) and Europol.

    This paper argues that the EU does not need any new ‘agencies’. Instead it advocates some modification of existing EU ‘intelligence agencies’ in order to allow them to provide the intelligence support needed for various EU policies. Whereas the present organisation of the INTDIV and the EUSC are regarded as adequate, reforms are proposed for the SITCEN and Europol. The paper emphasises the necessity to strengthen and enlarge the SITCEN, which provides the Union and its member states with external intelligence. Furthermore, Europol should cooperate closer with the agencies of the second pillar (CFSP), and its responsibilities be extended. Apart from adapting existing agencies, the Union should concentrate on facilitating direct cooperation among national agencies in areas that fall under the responsibility of member states. To this end, a European Intelligence Communication Network should be established. One must not be put off by the large technical and political challenges involved in the designing and setting up of such a network, which is necessary because it would allow various European and national intelligence producers to communicate and improve their ability to assess threats. It is also a prerequisite for common assessments, since the Union has only limited intelligence capabilities, in particular collection capabilities, and depends on the support of national agencies. As a result, national and European decision-makers could obtain the support needed for the efficient and coherent national and collective production of security. If the technical standards and the methods, format and content of communications are developed in cooperation with third parties, most notably the United States, candidate countries and NATO, additional points of contact could be established and exchange and cooperation with them enhanced.

    Towards a European intelligence policy
    Klaus Becher, Bernard Molard,Frédéric Oberson and Alessandro Politi
    Edited by Alessandro Politi

    In the first of the four essays that make up this Chaillot Paper, and which include both pragmatic and idealistic views of future cooperation on intelligence in Europe, Alessandro Politi starts from the premise that EU and WEU member countries will have to break away from their narrow concept of national sovereignty if they are to become influential international actors. He puts forward professional, economic and political reasons why both political leaders and intelligence operatives in Europe should engage in more systematic cooperation. He suggests that the creation of an informal intelligence policy could lead to a more cohesive intelligence community with capabilities comparable to those of the United States, adding that greater European cooperation should not be seen as a problem for bilateral or multilateral transatlantic relationships. The author’s prudent proposals concern joint training and cooperation in the fight against the ‘new risks’, while his more ambitious suggestions include high-level consensus on intelligence requirements, a transatlantic division of labour and joint assessment mechanisms within WEU.

    Frédéric Oberson describes the operation of WEU’s existing intelligence and open-source exploitation organs – the Brussels-based Intelligence Section and Situation Centre, respectively – and suggests how they might be made more effective. He deals in some detail with the relationship between the two and discusses the development of cooperation between them and WEU’s Satellite Centre. His recommendations concern the tasking and manning of the Intelligence Section, its contacts with national intelligence agencies, exchanges with NATO and the systematic exploitation of open-source information.

    In the third chapter, Bernard Molard, the Director of the WEU Satellite Centre, traces the history of the Centre since its creation in 1991 and indicates its possible evolution. He points out that, in terms of both its technical capability and human capital, the Centre is a unique asset. It produces intelligence that is available to WEU member states, providing a balanced interpretation of multisource (both commercial and classified) satellite imagery that can be used for both military and civilian purposes ranging from peacekeeping to disaster prevention and humanitarian aid. Following the Centre’s speedy provision of satellite imagery of Albania earlier this year, it has been tasked with extending its surveillance beyond the areas of potential crisis officially monitored by the WEU Council, and the author suggests improvements that would further enhance the Centre’s usefulness.

    Finally, Klaus Becher sets out the rationale for a significantly higher level of European cooperation, mainly regarding strategic intelligence, among national governments, who need to show the visible results of a successful foreign and security policy, and gain public acceptance of defence expenditure and intelligence agencies. The failure to recognize in a timely manner the nature of the crisis in Yugoslavia in 1991-92, for instance, shows that there is a need for agreed, shared intelligence assessments if the Europeans are to act effectively and avoid paralysis due to diverging perceptions of difficult strategic situations. As a first step in the setting up of an EU intelligence network, the author advocates the creation of an independent advisory commission tasked with drafting a report on European intelligence policy. The final objective would be an intergovernmental body of high-level intelligence officials – a European intelligence assessment board.

    Prospects for a European Common Intelligence Policy
    Walter L. Pforzheimer Award Winner

    Looking back, future European scholars and officials are likely to regard the 1990s as the critical turning point in the formation and structure of a European common intelligence policy (CIP). Just as the 1950s laid the foundation for the creation of the European Single Market and common currency, the 1990s laid the foundation for the creation of a European intelligence policy as well as its probable structure. From the 1991 Treaty of Maastricht, which established the European Union (EU), to the December 1999 EU summit in Helsinki, Finland, European leaders increasingly highlighted the need for Europe to develop intelligence collection and analysis capabilities autonomous of the United States as a necessary component of a European common defense and security policy. Contemporary scholars should be primarily concerned not with whether a European common intelligence policy will develop, but how it will develop and in what form.

    Despite the existence of motivating factors for increased cooperation, obstacles such as concerns over sovereignty, the fear of damaging privileged NATO relationships, and institutional limitations, probably will prevent the creation of a supranational European intelligence authority. While European intelligence cooperation will improve in important ways, it is likely to remain decentralized and primarily reactive, and is unlikely to pose any serious competition to NATO in the near term.

    European defence: making it work
    François Heisbourg
    with contributions by Nicole Gnesotto, Charles Grant,
    Karl Kaiser, Andrzej Karkoszka, Tomas Ries, Maartje Rutten,
    Stefano Silvestri, Alvaro Vasconcelos and Rob de Wijk
    Chapter Five

    One of the areas in which the US-European relationship may face some of the most difficult choices in future is strategic intelligence, which has an impact on security and defence policy just as it does on foreign policy.

    The US-British relationship in this field is crucial, both because it lies at the heart of the ‘special relationship’ between Washington and London and because, as we have seen, sustained and energetic British involvement will remain essential to the effectiveness of EDP, however it is defined. In other words, it is necessary to examine the possible conflicts of interest which could result from the simultaneous pursuit of the ‘special relationship’ and the progress of EDP.

    Indeed, one of the most stable and constant features of the geopolitical landscape is the special relationship between London and Washington on intelligence matters.

    The special relationship is at its most special in intelligence. There is close cooperation on human intelligence (HUMINT) between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (the SIS, also known as MI6); on defence intelligence between America’s Defence Intelligence Agency and the British Defence Intelligence Staff; on ‘overhead’ intelligence – that deriving from satellite photos, reconnaissance aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles – between America’s National Reconnaissance Office and Britain’s equivalent, the Joint Aerial Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (JARIC); and on signals intelligence (SIGINT) between America’s National Security Agency (NSA) and Britain’s General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).

    Each of the British intelligence services has a liaison office, staffed by senior officers, in the United States. These offices obtain material from the US services and supply British intelligence to them. There are also British officers seconded to US agencies at an operational level, and vice versa. No other European country has such intimate relations with the US agencies.

    Notitie over jihadrekruten in Nederland
    10 maart 2004

    Aan de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal

    Hierbij bied ik u een notitie aan in reactie op vragen die mevrouw mr. N.A. Kalsbeek tijdens het AO Bestrijding internationaal terrorisme van 30 september 2003 aan mij heeft gesteld. Mevrouw Kalsbeek vroeg mij om een schets van potentiële dan wel daadwerkelijke islamistische terroristen in Nederland.

    In de notitie wordt vooral een algemene beschrijving gegeven van processen en omstandigheden waarin potentiële islamistische terroristen in Nederland zich bevinden. Een volledige typering van deze personen is, gezien de complexiteit van het fenomeen, zeer moeilijk, zo niet onmogelijk te geven.

    J.W. Remkes




    Eigen Inlichtingen Eerst

    Europese spionage

    door Jelle van Buuren en Wil van der Schans

    De Groene Amsterdammer, nr 13 , 27 – 3 – 2004


    Na de aanslagen in Madrid klinkt alom de roep om een gezamenlijke Europese aanpak van de terreurbestrijding. Diezelfde roep klonk na de aanslagen van 11 september in de Verenigde Staten. Een indrukwekkende serie maatregelen en actieplannen werd gelanceerd, maar die blijken in praktijk weinig effect te hebben gesorteerd. Waarom lukt het de Europese Unie toch zo slecht om politie- en inlichtingendiensten te laten samenwerken?

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