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  • NSA spy row: France and Spain ‘shared phone data’ with US

    Spain and France’s intelligence agencies carried out collection of phone records and shared them with NSA, agency says

    European intelligence agencies and not American spies were responsible for the mass collection of phone records which sparked outrage in France and Spain, the US has claimed.

    General Keith Alexander, the head of the National Security Agency, said reports that the US had collected millions of Spanish and French phone records were “absolutely false”.

    “To be perfectly clear, this is not information that we collected on European citizens,” Gen Alexander said when asked about the reports, which were based on classified documents leaked by Edward Snowden, the former NSA contractor.

    Shortly before the NSA chief appeared before a Congressional committee, US officials briefed the Wall Street Journal that in fact Spain and France’s own intelligence agencies had carried out the surveillance and then shared their findings with the NSA.

    The anonymous officials claimed that the monitored calls were not even made within Spanish and French borders and could be surveillance carried on outside of Europe.
    Related Articles
    GCHQ monitors luxury hotel bookings made by foreign diplomats 17 Nov 2013
    US spy chief defends spying on foreign leaders 30 Oct 2013
    Germany, France and Spain ‘were all spying on citizens’ 01 Nov 2013
    Anger in France over claims that NSA spied on politicians, business leaders as well as terrorists 21 Oct 2013
    NSA spying: US should not be collecting calls on allies, says top senator 28 Oct 2013
    Russia ‘spied on G20 leaders with USB sticks’ 29 Oct 2013

    In an aggressive rebuttal of the reports in the French paper Le Monde and the Spanish El Mundo, Gen Alexander said “they and the person who stole the classified data [Mr Snowden] do not understand what they were looking at” when they published slides from an NSA document.

    The US push back came as President Barack Obama was said to be on the verge of ordering a halt to spying on the heads of allied governments.

    The White House said it was looking at all US spy activities in the wake of leaks by Mr Snowden but was putting a “special emphasis on whether we have the appropriate posture when it comes to heads of state”.

    Mr Obama was reported to have already halted eavesdropping at UN’s headquarters in New York.

    German officials said that while the White House’s public statements had become more conciliatory there remained deep wariness and that little progress had been made behind closed doors in formalising an American commitment to curb spying.

    “An agreement that you feel might be broken at any time is not worth very much,” one diplomat told The Telegraph.

    “We need to re-establish trust and then come to some kind of understanding comparable to the [no spy agreement] the US has with other English speaking countries.”

    Despite the relatively close US-German relations, the White House is reluctant to be drawn into any formal agreement and especially resistant to demands that a no-spy deal be expanded to cover all 28 EU member states.

    Viviane Reding, vice-president of the European Commission and EU justice commissioner, warned that the spying row could spill over and damage talks on a free-trade agreement between the EU and US.

    “Friends and partners do not spy on each other,” she said in a speech in Washington. “For ambitious and complex negotiations to succeed there needs to be trust among the negotiating partners. It is urgent and essential that our US partners take clear action to rebuild trust.”

    A spokesman for the US trade negotiators said it would be “unfortunate to let these issues – however important – distract us” from reaching a deal vital to freeing up transatlantic trade worth $3.3 billion dollars (£2bn) a day.

    James Clapper, America’s top national intelligence, told a Congressional hearing yesterday the US does not “spy indiscriminately on the citizens of any country”.

    “We do not spy on anyone except for valid foreign intelligence purposes, and we only work within the law,” Mr Clapper said. “To be sure on occasions we’ve made mistakes, some quite significant, but these are usually caused by human error or technical problems.”

    Pressure from European leaders was added to as some of the US intelligence community’s key Congressional allies balked at the scale of surveillance on friendly governments.

    Dianne Feinstein, the chair of powerful Senate intelligence committee, said she was “totally opposed” to tapping allied leaders and called for a wide-ranging Senate review of the activities of US spy agencies.

    “I do not believe the United States should be collecting phone calls or emails of friendly presidents and prime ministers,” she said.

    John Boehner, the Republican speaker of the house and a traditional hawk on national security, said US spy policy was “imbalanced” and backed calls for a review.

    Mr Boehner has previously been a staunch advocate of the NSA and faced down a July rebellion by libertarian Republicans who tried to pass a law significantly curbing the agency’s power.

    By Raf Sanchez, Peter Foster in Washington

    8:35PM GMT 29 Oct 2013

    Find this story at 29 October 2013

    © Copyright of Telegraph Media Group Limited 2013

    ‘We didn’t spy on the Europeans, their OWN governments did’, says NSA (but still no apology for tapping German chancellor Merkel’s phone)

    Gen. Keith Alexander, the National Security Agency director, says foreign governments spied on their own people and shared data with the U.S.
    The NSA had been accused of snooping on 130.5 million phone calls in France and Spain, and keeping computerized records
    Sen. Dianne Feinstein said newspapers in Europe ‘got it all wrong’

    Alexander’s denial will fall heavily on the fugitive leaker Edward Snowden and his journalist cohorts, whom the NSA chief said ‘did not understand what they were looking at’
    The National Security Agency’s director flatly denied as ‘completely false’ claims that U.S. intelligence agencies monitored tens of millions of phone calls in France and Spain during a month-long period beginning in late 2012.

    Gen. Keith Alexander contradicted the news reports that said his NSA had collected data about the calls and stored it as part of a wide-ranging surveillance program, saying that the journalists who wrote them misinterpreted documents stolen by the fugitive leaker Edward Snowden.

    And a key Democratic senator added that European papers that leveled the allegations ‘got it all wrong’ with respect to at least two countries – saying that it was those nations’ intelligence services that collected the data and shared it with their U.S. counterparts as part of the global war on terror.

    Protests: (Left to right) NSA Deputy Director Chris Inglis, NSA Director General Keith Alexander and DNI James Clapper look on as a protestor disrupts the Capitol Hill hearing

    National Security Agency Director Gen. Keith Alexander testified Tuesday that the governments of France and Spain conducted surveillance on their own citizens’ phone conversations, and then shared the intelligence data with the U.S.

    On Monday newspapers in three countries published computer-screen images, reportedly provided by Snowden, showing what appeared to be data hoovered up by the United States from European citizens’ phone calls.

    But Alexander testified in a House Intelligence Committee hearing that ‘those screenshots that show – or lead people to believe – that we, the NSA, or the U.S., collect that information is false.’

    ‘The assertions by reporters in France, Spain and Italy that NSA collected tens of millions of phone calls are completely false,’ Alexander said.

    According to the French newspaper Le Monde and the Spanish daily El Mundo, the NSA had collected the records of at least 70 million phone calls in France and another 60.5 million in Spain between December and January.

    Italy’s L’Espresso magazine also alleged, with help from Snowden, that the U.S. was engaged in persistent monitoring of Italy’s telecommunications networks.

    General Alexander denied it all.

    ‘To be perfectly clear, this is not information that we collected on European citizens. It represents information that we and our NATO allies have collected in defense of our countries and in support of military operations.’

    Reporters, he added, ‘cite as evidence screen shots of the results of a web tool used for data management purposes, but both they and the person who stole the classified data did not understand what they were looking at.’

    President Barack Obama said he is instituting a complete review of U.S. intelligence procedures in the wake of stinging allegations that the NSA has been peeping on foreign leaders through their phones and email accounts

    California Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein, who chairs the Senate Intelligence Committee, said Tuesday that ‘the papers got it all wrong on the two programs, France and Germany.’

    ‘This was not the United States collecting on France and Germany. This was France and Germany collecting. And it had nothing to do with their citizens, it had to do with collecting in NATO areas of war, like Afghanistan.’

    Feinstein on Monday called for a complete review of all the U.S. intelligence community’s spying programs, saying that ‘Congress needs to know exactly what our intelligence community is doing.’

    In the weekend’s other intelligence bombshell, the U.S. stood accused of snooping on German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cell phone and spying on Mexican President Felipe Calderon’s private emails.

    But Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told the committee that spying on foreign leaders is nothing new.

    ‘That’s a hardy perennial,’ he said, ‘and as long as I’ve been in the intelligence business, 50 years, leadership intentions, in whatever form that’s expressed, is kind of a basic tenet of what we are to collect and analyze.’

    ‘It’s one of the first things I learned in intel school in 1963,’ he assured the members of Congress, saying that the U.S. routinely spies on foreign leaders to ascertain their intentions, ‘no matter what level you’re talking about. That can be military leaders as well.’

    Clapper hinted that committee members had been briefed on such programs, saying that in cases where the NSA is surveilling foreign leaders, ‘that should be reported to the committee … in considerable detail’ as a ‘significant’ intelligence activity over which Congress has oversight.’

    He added that ‘we do only what the policymakers, writ large, have actually asked us to do.’

    Republican committee chair Mike Rogers of Michigan began the hearing by acknowledging that ‘every nation collects foreign intelligence’ and ‘that is not unique to the United States’.

    Clapper pleaded with the panel to think carefully before restricting the government’s ability to collect foreign intelligence, warning that they would be ‘incurring greater risks’ from overseas adversaries.

    Gen. Alexander dispensed with his prepared statement and spoke ‘from the heart,’ saying that his agency would rather ‘take the beatings’ from reporters and the public ‘than … give up a program’ that would prevent a future attack on the nation.

    The Wall Street Journal reported Tuesday afternoon that other U.S. officials had confirmed Alexander’s version of events, and that the electronic spying in France and Spain was carried out by those nations’ governments.

    The resulting phone records, they said, were then shared with the NSA as part of a program aimed at keeping U.S. military personnel and civilians safe in areas of military conflict.

    None of the nations involved would speak to the Journal about their own level of involvement in a scandal that initially touched only the U.S., but which now promises to embroil intelligence services on a global scale.

    By David Martosko, U.s. Political Editor

    PUBLISHED: 21:45 GMT, 29 October 2013 | UPDATED: 10:59 GMT, 30 October 2013

    Find this story at 29 October 2013

    © Associated Newspapers Ltd


    NSA Powerpoint Slides on BOUNDLESSINFORMANT

    These 4 slides are from the powerpoint “BOUNDLESSINFORMANT: Describing Mission Capabilities from Metadata Records.” They include the cover page and pages 3, 5, and 6 of the presentation. The powerpoint, leaked to the Guardian newspaper’s Glenn Greenwald by Edward Snowden, was first released by the Guardian newspaper on June 8, 2013 at this web page: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-data-mining-slides

    Also included with this collection is a “heat map” of parts of the world most subject to surveillance by Boundless Informant. This image was embedded in the Guardian’s story, which described Boundless Informant as “the NSA’s secret tool to track global surveillance data,” which collected “almost 3 billion pieces of intelligence from US computer networks over a 30-day period ending in March 2013.” http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining

    BOUNDLESSINFORMANT – Frequently Asked Questions


    (U/FOUO) Questions


    1) What is BOUNDLESSINFORMANT! What is its purpose?

    2) Who are the intended users of the tool?

    3) What are the different views?

    4) Where do you get your data?

    5) Do you have all the data? What data is missing?

    6) Why are you showing metadata record counts versus content?

    7) Do you distinguish between sustained collect and survey collect?

    8) What is the technical architecture for the tool?

    9) What are some upcoming features/enhancements?

    1 0) How are new features or views requested and prioritized?

    1 1) Why are record counts different from other tools like ASDF and What’s On Cover?

    12) Why is the tool NOFORN? Is there a releasable version?

    13) How do you compile your record counts for each country?


    Note: This document is a work-in-progress and will be updated frequently as additional
    questions and guidance are provided.

    1) (U) What is BOUNDLESSINFORMANT? What is its purpose?

    (U//FOUO) BOUNDLESSINFORMANT is a GAO prototype tool for a self-documenting SIGINT
    system. The purpose of the tool is to fundamentally shift the manner in which GAO describes its
    collection posture. BOUNDLESSINFORMANT provides the ability to dynamically describe GAO’s
    collection capabilities (through metadata record counts) with no human intervention and graphically
    display the information in a map view, bar chart, or simple table. Prior to

    BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, the method for understanding the collection capabilities of GAO’s
    assets involved ad hoc surveying of repositories, sites, developers, and/or programs and offices. By
    extracting information from every DNI and DNR metadata record, the tool is able to create a near real-
    time snapshot of GAO’s collection capability at any given moment. The tool allows users to select a
    country on a map and view the metadata volume and select details about the collection against that
    country. The tool also allows users to view high level metrics by organization and then drill down to a
    more actionable level – down to the program and cover term.

    Sample Use Cases

    • (U//FOUO) How many records are collected for an organizational unit (e.g. FORNSAT)?

    • (U//FOUO) How many records (and what type) are collected against a particular country?

    • (U//FOUO) Are there any visible trends for the collection?

    • (U//FOUO) What assets collect against a specific country? What type of collection?

    • (U//FOUO) What is the field of view for a specific site? What countriees does it collect
    against? What type of collection?

    2) (U) Who are the intended users of the tool?

    • (U//FOUO) Mission and collection managers seeking to understand output characteristics
    of a site based on what is being ingested into downstream repositories. .

    (U//FOUO) Strategic Managers seeking to understand top level metrics at the


    organization/office level or seeking to answer data calls on NSA collection capability.





    BOUNDLESSINFORMANT – Frequently Asked Questions


    • (U//FOUO) Analysts looking for additional sites to task for coverage of a particular

    technology within a specific country.

    3) What are the different views?

    (U//FOUO) Map View – The Map View is designed to allow users to view overall DNI, DNR, or
    aggregated collection posture of the agency or a site. Clicking on a country will show the collection
    posture (record counts, type of collection, and contributing SIGADs or sites) against that particular
    country in addition to providing a graphical display of record count trends. In order to bin the records
    into a country, a normalized phone number (DNR) or an administrative region atom (DNI) must be
    populated within the record. Clicking on a site (within the Site Specific view) will show the viewshed
    for that site – what countries the site collects against.

    (U//FOUO) Org View – The Organization View is designed to allow users to view the metadata record
    counts by organizational structure (i.e. GAO – SSO – RAM-A – SPINNERET) all the way down to the
    cover term. Since it’s not necessary to have a normalized number or administrative region populated,
    the numbers in the Org View will be higher than the numbers in the Map View.

    (U//FOUO) Similarity View – The Similarity View is currently a placeholder view for an upcoming
    feature that will graphically display sites that are similar in nature. This can be used to identify areas
    for a de-duplication effort or to inform analysts of additional SIGADs to task for queries (similar to
    Amazon’s “if you like this item, you’ll also like these” feature).


    4) (U) Where do you get your data?

    (U//FOUO) BOUNDLESSINFORMANT extracts metadata records from GM-PLACE post-
    FALLOUT (DNI ingest processor) and post-TUSKATTIRE (DNR ingest processor). The records are
    enriched with organization information (e.g. SSO, FORNSAT) and cover term. Every valid DNI and
    DNR metadata record is aggregated to provide a count at the appropriate level. See the different views
    question above for additional information.


    5) (U) Do you have all the data? What data is missing?

    • (U//FOUO) The tool resides on GM-PLACE which is only accredited up to TS//SI//NOFORN.
    Therefore, the tool does not contain ECI or FISA data.

    • (U//FOUO) The Map View only shows counts for records with a valid normalized number
    (DNR) or administrative region atom (DNI).

    • (U//FOUO) Only metadata records that are sent back to NSA-W through FASCIA or
    FALLOUT are counted. Therefore, programs with a distributed data distribution system (e.g.
    MUSCULAR and Terrestrial RF) are not currently counted.

    • (U//FOUO) Only SIGINT records are currently counted. There are no ELINT or other “INT”
    records included.

    6) (U) Why are you showing metadata record counts versus content?


    7) (U ) Do you distin g uish between sustained collect and survey collect?

    (U//FOUO) The tool currently makes no distinction between sustained collect and survey collect. This
    feature is on the roadmap.





    BOUNDLESSINFORMANT – Frequently Asked Questions


    8) What is the technical architecture for the tool?

    Click here for a graphical view of the tool’s architecture

    (U//FOUO) DNI metadata (ASDF), DNR metadata (FASCIA) delivered to Hadoop
    Distributed File System (HDFS) on GM-PLACE

    (U//FOUO) Use Java MapReduce job to transform/filter and enrich FASCIA/ASDF data with
    business logic to assign organization rules to data

    (U//FOUO) Bulk import of DNI/DNR data (serialized Google Protobuf objects) into
    Cloudbase (enabled by custom aggregators)

    (U//FOUO) Use Java web app (hosted via Tomcat) on MachineShop (formerly Turkey Tower)
    to query Cloudbase

    (U//FOUO) GUI triggers queries to CloudBase – GXT (ExtGWT)


    9) What are some upcoming features/enhancements?

    • (U//FOUO) Add technology type (e.g. JUGGERNAUT, LOPER) to provide additional
    granularity in the numbers

    (U//FOUO) Add additional details to the Differential view

    (U//FOUO) Refine the Site Specific view

    (U//FOUO) Include CASN information

    (U//FOUO) Add ability to export data behind any view (pddg,sigad,sysid,casn,tech,count)

    (U//FOUO) Add in selected (vs. unselected) data indicators

    (U//FOUO) Include filter for sustained versus survey collection


    10) How are new features or views requested and prioritized?

    (U//FOUO) The team uses Flawmill to accept user requests for additional functionality or
    enhancements. Users are also allowed to vote on which functionality or enhancements are most
    important to them (as well as add comments). The BOUNDLESSINFORMANT team will periodically
    review all requests and triage according to level of effort (Easy, Medium, Hard) and mission impact
    (High, Medium, Low). The team will review the queue with the project champion and government
    steering committee to be added onto the BOUNDLESSINFORMANT roadmap.

    1 1) Why are record counts different from other tools like ASDF and What’s On


    (U//FOUO) There are a number of reasons why record counts may vary. The purpose of the tool is to




    Page 3 o:



    July 13, 2012

    Find this story at  txt

    Find this story at jpeg

    Find this story at pdf

    The Radome Archipelago (1999)

    During the Cold War there were hundreds of secret remote listening posts spread around the globe. From large stations in the moors of Scotland and mountains of Turkey that were complete with golf balllike structures called “radomes” to singly operated stations in the barren wilderness of Saint Lawrence Island between Alaska and Siberia that had only a few antennae, these stations constituted the ground-based portion of the United States Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) System or “USSS.”

    Operated by the supersecret National Security Agency (NSA), these stations were designed to intercept Morse Code, telephone, telex, radar, telemetry, and other signals emanating from behind the Iron Curtain. At one time, the NSA contemplated a worldwide, continuously operated array of 4120 intercept stations. While the agency never achieved that goal, it could still boast of several hundred intercept stations. These included its ground-based “outstations,” which were supplemented by other intercept units located on ships, submarines, aircraft (from U-2s to helicopters), unmanned drones, mobile vans, aerostats (balloons and dirigibles), and even large and cumbersome backpacks.

    With the collapse of the Communist “bloc” and the advent of microwaves, fiber optics, and cellular phones, NSA’s need for numerous ground-based intercept stations waned. It began to rely on a constellation of sophisticated SIGINT satellites with code names like Vortex, Magnum, Jumpseat, and Trumpet to sweep up the world’s satellite, microwave, cellular, and high-frequency communications and signals. Numerous outstations met with one of three fates: they were shut down completely, remoted to larger facilities called Regional SIGINT Operations Centers or “RSOCs,” or were turned over to host nation SIGINT agencies to be operated jointly with NSA.

    However, NSA’s jump to relying primarily on satellites proved premature. In 1993, Somali clan leader Mohammed Farah Aideed taught the agency an important lesson. Aideed’s reliance on older and lower-powered walkie-talkies and radio transmitters made his communications virtually silent to the orbiting SIGINT “birds” of the NSA. Therefore, NSA technicians came to realize there was still a need to get in close in some situations to pick up signals of interest. In NSA’s jargon this is called improving “hearability.”

    As NSA outstations were closed or remoted, new and relatively smaller intercept facilities such as the “gateway” facility in Bahrain, reportedly used for retransmit signals intercepted in Baghdad last year to the U.S. sprang up around the world. In addition to providing NSA operators with fresh and exotic duty stations, the new stations reflected an enhanced mission for NSA economic intelligence gathering. Scrapping its old Cold War A and B Group SIGINT organization, NSA expanded the functions of its W Group to include SIGINT operations against a multitude of targets. Another unit, M Group, would handle intercepts from new technologies like the Internet.

    Many people who follow the exploits of SIGINT and NSA are eager to peruse lists of secret listening posts operated by the agency and its partners around the world. While a master list probably exists somewhere in the impenetrable lair that is the NSA’s Fort Meade, Maryland, headquarters, it is assuredly stamped with one of the highest security classifications in the U.S. intelligence community.  W.M. & J.V.

    The United States SIGINT System (USSS)

    The following list is the best unclassified shot at describing the locations of the ground-based “ears” of the Puzzle Palace. It is culled from press accounts, informed experts, and books written about the NSA and its intelligence partners. It does not include the numerous listening units on naval vessels and aircraft nor those operating from U.S. and foreign embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic missions.

    United States

    NSA Headquarters, Fort Meade, Maryland
    Buckley Air National Guard Ground Base, Colorado
    Fort Gordon, Georgia (RSOC)
    Imperial Beach, California
    Kunia, Hawaii (RSOC)
    Northwest, Virginia
    Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico
    San Antonio, Texas (RSOC)
    Shemya, Alaska -3
    Sugar Grove, West Virginia
    Winter Harbor, Maine
    Yakima, Washington


    Durres -6
    Shkoder -6
    Tirana -6

    Ascension Island

    Two Boats -1


    Bamaga -6 -7
    Cabarlah -7
    Canberra (Defense Signals Directorate Headquarters) -5
    Harman -7
    Kojarena, Geraldton -1
    Nurunggar -1
    Pearce -1
    Pine Gap, Alice Springs -1
    Riverina -7
    Shoal Bay, Darwin -1
    Watsonia -1


    Konigswarte -7
    Neulengbach -7


    Al-Muharraq Airport -3
    Bosnia and Herzegovina



    Mapharangwane Air Base

    British Indian Ocean Territory

    Diego Garcia -1


    Bandar Seri Begawan -7


    Alert -7
    Gander -7
    Leitrim -1
    Masset -6 -7
    Ottawa [Communications Security Establishment (CSE) Headquarters] -5


    Korla -1 -6
    Qitai -1 -6


    Brac� Island, Croatia -6
    Zagreb-Lucko Airport -7


    Guantanamo Bay


    Ayios Nikolaos -1


    Aflandshage -7
    Almindingen, Bornholm -7
    Dueodde, Bornholm -7
    Gedser -7
    Hj�rring -7
    L�gumkl�ster -7


    Dahlak Island -1 (NSA/Israel “8200” site)


    Tallinn -7


    Addis Ababa -1


    Santahamina -7

    French Guiana

    Kourou -7 (German Federal Intelligence Service station)


    Achern -7
    Ahrweiler -7
    Bad Aibling -2
    Bad M�nstereifel -7
    Braunschweig -7
    Darmstadt -7
    Frankfurt -7
    Hof -7
    Husum -7
    Mainz -7
    Monschau -7
    Pullach (German Federal Intelligence Service Headquarters) -5
    Rheinhausen -7
    Stockdorf -7
    Strassburg -7
    Vogelweh, Germany


    Gibraltar -7


    Ir�klion, Crete



    Hong Kong

    British Consulate, Victoria (“The Alamo”) -7


    Keflavik -3


    Charbatia -7


    Herzliyya (Unit 8200 Headquarters) -5
    Mitzpah Ramon -7
    Mount Hermon, Golan Heights -7
    Mount Meiron, Golan Heights -7


    San Vito -6


    Futenma, Okinawa
    Hanza, Okinawa
    Higashi Chitose -7
    Higashi Nemuro -7
    Kofunato -7
    Miho -7
    Nemuro -7
    Ohi -7
    Rebunto -7
    Shiraho -7
    Tachiarai -7

    Korea (South)

    Kanghwa-do Island -7
    Osan -1
    Pyong-dong Island -7
    P’yongt’aek -1
    Taegu -1 -2 -6
    Tongduchon -1
    Uijo�ngbu -1
    Yongsan -1




    Ventspils -7


    Vilnius -7


    Amsterdam (Technical Intelligence Analysis Center (TIVC) Headquarters)-5
    Emnes -7
    Terschelling -7

    New Zealand

    Tangimoana -7
    Waihopai -1
    Wellington (Government Communications Security Bureau Headquarters -5


    Borhaug -7
    Fauske/Vetan -7
    Jessheim -7
    Kirkenes -1
    Randaberg -7
    Skage/Namdalen -7
    Vads� -7
    Vard� -7
    Viksjofellet -7


    Abut -1
    Goat Island, Musandam Peninsula -3
    Khasab, Musandam Peninsula -3
    Masirah Island -3




    Galeta Island -3

    Papua New Guinea

    Port Moresby -7


    Terceira Island, Azores



    S�o Tom� and Pr�ncipe


    Saudi Arabia

    Araz -7
    Khafji -7


    Kranji -7


    Pico de las Nieves, Grand Canary Island -7
    Manzanares -7
    Playa de Pals -3

    Solomon Islands

    Honiara -7

    Sri Lanka



    Karlskrona -7
    Lov�n (Swedish FRA Headquarters) -7
    Musk� -7


    Merishausen -7
    R�thi -7


    Quemoy -7
    Matsu -7
    Shu Lin Kuo -5 (German Federal Intelligence Service/NSA/Taiwan J-3 SIGINT service site)


    Agri -7
    Antalya -7
    Edirne -7
    Istanbul -7
    Izmir -7
    Sinop -7


    Aranyaprathet -7
    Khon Kaen -1 -3
    Surin -7
    Trat -7


    Galangala Island, Ssese Islands (Lake Victoria)

    United Arab Emirates

    Az-Zarqa� -3
    Dalma� -3
    Ras al-Khaimah -3
    Sir Abu Nuayr Island -3

    United Kingdom:

    Belfast (Victoria Square) -7
    Brora, Scotland -7
    Cheltenham (Government Communications Headquarters) -5
    Chicksands -7
    Culm Head -7
    Digby -7
    Hawklaw, Scotland -7
    Irton Moor -7
    Menwith Hill, Harrogate -1 (RSOC)
    Molesworth -1
    Morwenstow -1
    Westminster, London -7
    (Palmer Street)
    Socotra Island (planned)


    -1 Joint facility operated with a SIGINT partner.

    -2 Joint facility partially operated with a SIGINT partner.

    -3 Contractor-operated facility.

    -4 Remoted facility.

    -5 NSA liaison is present.

    -6 Joint NSA-CIA site.

    -7 Foreign-operated “accommodation site” that provides occasional SIGINT product to the USSS.

    February 24 – March 2, 1999
    jason vest and wayne madsen A Most Unusual Collection Agency

    Find this story at February March 1999

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