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  • Committee Study of the ClA’s Detention and lnterrogation Program (2014)

    Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl

    #1: The CIA’s use of its enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees.
    #2: The CIA’s justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation  techniques rested on inaccurate claims of their effectiveness.
    #3: The interrogations of CIA detainees were brutal and far worse than the CIA represented to policymakers and others.
    #4: The conditions of confinement for CIA detainees were harsher than the CIA had represented to policymakers and others.
    #5: The CIA repeatedly  provided inaccurate information to the Department of Justice, impeding a proper legal analysis of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.
    #6: The CIA bas actively avoided or impeded congressional oversight of the program.
    #7:  The CIA impeded effective White House oversight and decision-making.
    #8: The CIA ‘s operation and management of the program complicated, and in some cases impeded, the national security missions of other Executive Branch agencies.
    #9: The CIA impeded oversight by the CIA ‘s Office of Inspector General.
    #10: The CIA coordinated the release of classified information to the media, including inaccurate information concerning the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
    #ll: The CIA was unprepared as it began operating its Detention and Interrogation Program more than six months after  being granted detention authorities.
    #12: The CIA’s management and operation of its Detention and Interrogation  Program was deeply flawed tbrough out the program’s duration, particularly so in 2002 and early 2003.
    #13: Two contract psychologists devised the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques and played a central  role in the operation, assessments, and management of the CIA ‘s Detention and Interrogation Program. By 2005, the CIA had overwhelmingly  outsourced operations related  to the program.
    #14: CIA detainees  were subjected to coercive interrogation techniques that had not been approved by the Department of Justice or had not been authorized by CIA
    #15: The CIA did not conduct a comprehensive or accurate accounting of the number  of individuals it detained, and held individuals who did not meet the legal standard for detention. The CIA’s claims about the number of detainees held and subjected  to its enhanced  interrogation techniques were inaccurate.
    #16:  The CIA failed  to adequately evaluate the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques.
    #17: The CIA rarely reprimanded or held personnel accountable for serious and significant violations, inappropriate activities, and systemic and individual management failures.
    #18: The CIA marginalized and ignored numerous internal critiques, criticisms, and objections concerning the operation and management of the  CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.
    #19: The CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program  was inherently  unsustainable and had effectively ended by 2006 due to unauthorized press disclosures, reduced  cooperation from other  nations, and legal and oversight concerns.
    #20: The CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program damaged  the United States’ standing in the world, and resulted in other significant  monetary  and non-monetary costs.
    Find the report at 9 December 2014