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  • Response of the French delegation to 13370/99 EUROPOL 48

    EXTRACTED TEXT FROM:

    COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

    8 February 2000

    5845/00

    LIMITE

    EUROPOL 1

    NOTE from General Secretariat to Europol Working Party

    No. prev. doc.:  13370/99 EUROPOL 48

    Subject :  Comments by delegations to the “First reflections concerning the Tampere Conclusions as far as they relate to Europol” as contained in doc. 13370/99 EUROPOL 48

    ANNEX IX

    RESPONSE BY THE FRENCH DELEGATION

    1- Recommendation 43: Joint investigative teams

    France thinks that the reference text for the operation of joint investigative teams must be Article 13 of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.

    In order to set up joint investigative teams without delay, as stipulated in the Tampere European Council conclusions, France proposes that the Council adopt a decision including, following the opinion of the Europol Management Board, the principle that Europol officers should take part in the joint investigative teams for Europol missions. The joint teams would operate in accordance with national law and in the specific area laid down by the Tampere Council.

    That decision should specify that, within the limits of the objectives pursued, one-off exchanges of information between members of a joint investigative team are acceptable. All information for entry in a data base or inclusion in a judicial procedure must, on the other hand, follow the path laid down in the Europol Convention.

    2- Recommendation 44: Operational Task Force

    It is not desirable for this Task Force to be set up within the Europol framework. It should be a vehicle for operational directors to exchange views. Task Force meetings should be held in the country of the Presidency. Institutionally, the Task Force should be directly answerable to Coreper.

    3- Recommendation 45: Access to operational data

    Refusal to give Europol access to the contents of the SIS data bases. Such a request would entail amendment of the Europol and Schengen Conventions. France is against giving Europol access to the contents of the SIS data bases.

    A “request” from Europol, under Article 30 of the Amsterdam Treaty, asking Member States to conduct or coordinate their investigations would not be of a binding nature as there is nothing in current French law authorising the principle of supranational control on action by the competent authorities.

    4- Recommendation 46: EUROJUST

    Thinking on EUROJUST is not sufficiently advanced to respond on this point here and now.

    5- Recommendation 51: Analysis and transfer of operational data on areas relating to money laundering

    No response can be given on this point which is linked to Recommendation 56.

    6- Recommendation 56: Europol competence on money laundering

    Since this point is not covered in the initial Convention, the Europol Convention will need to be amended. However, we must move forward on this point.

    Conclusion

    France would also like these issues discussed by the Article 36 Committee which might refer them to the competent working party.

    ~~~~~

    Source of this document: SEMDOC database

    Statewatch European Monitoring and Documentation Centre

    e-mail: office@statewatch.org