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  • (TS//REL TO USA, ISR) Subject: NSA Intelligence Relationship with Israel

    Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl

    (U) Introduction
    (TS//N F) NSA maintains a far-reaching technical and analytic relationship with the
    Israeli SIGINT National Unit (ISNU) sharing information on access, intercept, targeting,
    language, analysis and reporting. This SIGINT relationship has increasingly been the
    catalyst for a broader intelligence relationship between the United States and Israel.
    Significant changes in the way NSA and ISNU have traditionally approached SIGINT
    have prompted an expansion to include other Israeli and U.s. intelligence organizations
    such as CIA, Mossad, and Special Operation Division (SOD).
    (U) Key Issues
    (TS//SI//N F) The single largest exchange between N SA and ISN U is on targets in the
    Middle East which constitute strategic threats to U.s. and Israeli interests. Building
    upon a robust analytic exchange, NSA and ISNU also have explored and executed
    unique opportunities to gain access to high priority targets. The mutually agreed upon
    geographic targets include the countries of North Africa, the Middle East, the Persian
    Gulf, South Asia, and the Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union. Within that set of
    countries, cooperation covers the exploitation of internal governmental, military, civil,
    and diplomatic communications; and external security/intelligence organizations.
    Regional Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and “Stateless”/lnternational
    Terrorism comprise the exchanged transnational target set. A dedicated
    communications line between NSA and ISN U supports the exchange of raw material, as
    well as daily analytic and technical correspondence. Both N SA and ISN U have liaison
    officers, who conduct foreign relations functions, stationed at their respective
    (TS//REL TO USA, ISR) What NSA Provides to ISNU
    (TS//SI//REL TO USA, ISR) The Israeli side enjoys the benefits of expanded geographic
    access to world-class NSA cryptanalytic and SIGINT engineering expertise, and also
    gains controlled access to advanced U.s. technology and equipment via
    accommodation buys and foreign military sales.
    (TS//REL TO USA, ISR) What ISNU Provides to NSA
    (TS//SI//RE L TO USA, ISR) Benefits to the U.s. include expanded geographic access to
    high priority SIGINT targets, access to world-class Israeli cryptanalytic and SIGINT
    engineering expertise, and access to a large pool of highly qualified analysts.
    Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
    Dated: 20070108
    Declassify On: 20371101
    (U) Success Stories _
    (TS//SI//REL TO USA, ISR) A key priority for ISN U is the Iranian nuclear development
    program, followed by Syrian nuclear efforts, Lebanese Hizballah plans and intentions,
    Palestinian terrorism, and Global Jihad. Several recent and successful joint operations
    between N SA and IS N U have broadened both organizations’ ability to target and exploit
    Iranian nuclear efforts. In addition, a robust and dynamic cryptanalytic relationship has
    enabled breakthroughs on high priority Iranian targets.
    (TS//REL TO USA, ISR) NSA and ISNU continue to initiate joint targeting of Syrian and
    Iranian leadership and nuclear development programs with CIA, ISNU, SOD and
    Massad. This exchange has been particularly important as unrest in Syria continues,
    and both sides work together to identify threats to regional stability. N SA’s cyber
    partnerships expanded beyond IS N U to include Israeli Defense Intelligence’s soD and
    Massad, resulting in unprecedented access and collection breakthroughs that all sides
    acknowledge would not have been possible to achieve without the others.
    (TS//SI//N F) In July 2012, the Office of the Director of N ationallntelligence (ODN I)
    provided guidance for expanded sharing with the GOI (Government of Israel) on Egypt.
    This approval has allowed N SA to task for ISN U on select strategic issues, specifically
    terrorist elements in the Sinai.
    (S//N F) Beyond the traditional SIGI NT relationship, N SA and ISN U signed a M 0 U in
    September 2011 providing for Information Assurance/Computer Network Defense
    collaboration. N SA’s Information Assurance Deputy Director anended an lAIC N D
    conference in Tel Aviv in January 2012 during which N SA and ISN U established
    objectives for the relationship. NSA intends to focus the collaboration on cyber threats
    from Iran, H izballah and other regional actors and may provide limited, focused support
    on specific Russian and Chinese cyber threats. Conferences to further develop this
    partnership were held in May 2012 and December 2012.
    (TS//SI//REL TO USA, ISR) NSA and ISNU led their communities in the establishment
    of U.s. – Israeli Intelligence Community VTC connectivity that allows both sides to
    broaden and accelerate the pace of collaboration against targets’ use of advanced
    telecommunications. Target sets include, but are not limited to Iran Nuclear, Syrian
    Foreign Fighter movements, Lebanese Hizballah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard
    Corps activities. Dialogue is ongoing, with each potential new intelligence or technology
    initiative considered for approval individually.
    (U) Problems/Challenges
    (TS//N F) The three most common concerns raised by ISN U regarding the partnership
    with NSA is NSA’s reluctance to share on technology that is not directly related to a
    specific target, ISN U’s perceived reduction in the amount and degree of cooperation in
    certain areas, and the length of time NSA takes to decide on ISN U proposals. Efforts in
    these three areas have been addressed with the partner and NSA continues to work to
    increase cooperation with IS N U, where appropriate and mindful of U.s. policy and
    equity concerns.
    (U//FOUO) Updated by:
    Country Desk Officer
    Fo n Affairs Directorate

    view the file at